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#634:Guy Antoine's query : from Dailey
From: PETER DAILEY <HOLMES11@prodigy.net>
Guy Antoine has suggested that I elaborate on some
statements I made in an earlier posting on structural
adjustment (#548) that apparently were unclear.
I noted that by far and away the most profound of the
various "reforms" had been the reduction or elimination
of tariffs on agricultural imports, a measure taken early
in Preval's term that attracted very little public
discussion or controversy. I stated as well that various
measures designed to help the Haitian farmer cope had
been approved but never implemented.
Guy asks what these measures were. My impression is
that aside from technical assistance they primarily made
credit available for mechanization, repair of irrigation
canals, purchase of fertilizer, construction of storage
facilities, etc. I'm sure Merrill Smith knows the answer.
On reconsideration, however, I'm not sure how much, if
any, of this was directed toward the Haitian peasant. In
an interview with Fritz Longchamps on March 22, 1999,
Max Blanchet's translation of which was posted on April
8, FL was asked what the Preval government was doing
to stimulate economic growth. Longchamps said that
they had done the unprecedented, and invested more
than $200 million in agricultural loans. This, he notes,
"is a way of boosting Haiti's productive sectors and
streamlining the investment codes so as to increase
exports," something, I think we would agree, distinct
from aiding peasant farmers. "Unfortunately," Fritz
notes, "this coincided with Prime Minister Smarth's
decision in 1997 to resign. With the post unfilled, we
couldn't implement the policies that we initiated and
which the parliament approved."
I wrote as well that I doubted that the GOH, faced with
the international lenders proposals, ever had a choice
other than to dig in, negotiate the best deal
possible, and move on. Guy asks if I believe that the
Government's powerless resulted from an utter lack of
capital or were there other equally important factors.
The overwhelming factor, clearly, was an utter lack of
capital.
I state that the privatization of Teleco appears to be
pushing toward a conclusion, and Guy asks if I can be
more specific about the outcome and whether I regard it
as a good thing. I imagine that Teleco will be operated as
a joint venture with the GOH retaining a minority
interest but don't know for sure. Do I regard this as a
good thing? Yes, I really really do. Quite apart from the
gross mismanagement, incompetence, featherbedding,
nepotism, corruption etc., the abysmal quality of service
really beggars description. The modernization of Teleco
and extension of service will cost many hundreds of
millions the only source of which is foreign and domestic
private investors.
Guy asks whether I believe the many alternative
proposals that have been put forth make more sense or
less sense than the international lenders plan to
restructure Haitian agriculture toward export. I believe
that almost all of them make more sense but since none
of them suggests a way whereby they might be financed,
none of them can be regarded as real alternatives.
Finally, I refer to amounts "tacitly set aside by the
lenders for the satisfaction of the corrupt instincts of
Haiti's rulers," and Guy asks a number of questions, both
practical and philosophical, that I am unable to answer. I
should start by acknowledging that my original statement
was unfortunately phrased, and that I do not believe that
Haitian politicians are any more venal than their
counterparts elsewhere, or less willing to subordinate
their personal interests to the national good. At the
moment, however, it is hard to believe in the future and
"Make Hay while the Sun Shines" is definitely the order
of the day.
The negotiation of the loan agreements is an intensely
political process. A typical U.S. budget contains obsolete
or useless weapons systems the cost of which is in the
billions included solely to insure the support of a crucial
Senator. The representatives of the international lenders,
it is my belief, take an extremely realistic view of the
Haitian political situation and the importance of the
cooperation and support or lack of opposition of
various actors and sectors and do what they can to
accomodate them. I don't believe that it is a matter of
suitcases of cash or Swiss bank accounts but of funding
projects that do not make strict economic sense or have
a lower priority than others. I imagine that they regard
the total elimination of corruption as utopian and the
question rather as one of degree, and that the total
elimination is a lesser imperative than implementing a
project that they believe will help the Haitian people. I
also believe that the lenders have a pretty precise idea of
which methods of funding or implementation of
programs are susceptible to abuse, and when they employ
them do so fully aware that abuse may occur. I hope this
doesn't sound too Oliver Stone-ish!
Finally, it would surprise me extremely if the GOH
received hundreds of millions to spend as it sees fit. I said
that the international lenders would "misspend" the
money because I don't believe it is possible for the World
Bank or anyone else to restructure successfully on a
macro economic level, and because I believe that the
goal of transforming Haitian agriculture toward export is
a profoundly misguided one, for most of the same
reasons that Josh DeWind elaborated on back in the
Eighties. The aid contemplated will have some good
effects and some bad effects. This, I think, is preferable
to continued stasis, the prospect of negative growth, and
the vortex of diminishing resources. I don't believe there
can ever be any decisive change without responsibile and
farsighted leadership from Haiti's government and civil
sector, and at the moment there is very little sign of
that.
Peter Dailey