12467: OAS/ Haiti - CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: Stanley  Lucas <slucas@iri.org>

III.       CONCLUSIONS

            As a result of the deliberations based on its investigation, the Commission has arrived at the following conclusions:

A.     The armed attack on the National Palace in Port-au-Prince during the early hours of Monday, December 17, 2001

1.                  There was an armed attack on the National Palace during the early hours of the morning of December 17, 2001.

2.                  The attack was carried out by persons experienced in the use of heavy military weapons.

3.                  The political Opposition did not participate in the planning or in the execution of the attack on the National Palace.

4.                  The resistance of the Haitian National Police was pitiful and its counterattack, insignificant.  Nevertheless, the SWAT Team did play an important role in the pursuit of the attackers.

5.                  The attack on the National Palace could not have taken place without the complicity of some police officers from different units.

6.                  The objective of the attack on the National Palace does not correspond with the objective of producing a coup d'etat.

7.                  The call for "peaceful mobilization" of the population was one of the contributing factors to the turmoil which followed the events of December 17.

B.     The ransacking and burning of the Headquarters of the Political Parties of the Opposition, the private residences of the leaders of the Convergence Démocratique and of cultural and academic centers, national or foreign, in Port-au-Prince and in other cities and localities

1.                  The attackers on the headquarters of the Opposition political parties and the residences of the leaders of Convergence Démocratique acted with impunity.  They continue to enjoy immunity from the judicial and investigative institutions of Haiti.

2.                  The ransacking and burning of houses was premeditated.  Arms were distributed by some Government and party officials.  The attackers were transported in official vehicles and threatened to kill leaders of the political Opposition parties, all with the participation of members of Popular Organizations.

3.                  The National Haitian Police remained passive and complacent to the acts of violence, in flagrant violation of the Constitution and national laws of Haiti during those attacks.

4.                  In many instances, police officers and locally elected officials were accomplices to those attacks.

5.                  Popular Organizations have demonstrated their strength and influence vis-à-vis an unprofessional and incapable police force.

6.                  The policy of "zero tolerance" has been interpreted in a distorted manner that has generated violence and injustice.

7.                  The administration of justice is heavily influenced by the authorities and the Popular Organizations that work with them.

8.                  There is a clear denial of justice for those who do not support the ruling party.

C.     Possible links between the incidents mentioned in A and B above and the acts of violence of July 28, 2001, in Port-au-Prince and in other places in Haiti

1.       None of the attacks was directly and physically aimed at the President of the Republic.

2.       None of the attacks was conducive to a confrontation with the security unit directly assigned to the President of the Republic.

3.       Both attacks were perpetrated by uniformed persons employing military techniques.

4.       In both cases the passivity of the authorities was evident and in many instances there seems to have been complicity.

5.       The attacks made evident the weaknesses of Haiti's National Police, which is the only legitimately armed authority in the country.

6.       In both cases, damage was inflicted on the Opposition political parties, both to their headquarters and to the residences of the leaders of Convergence Démocratique.

7.       In both cases, the impunity of the attackers has become evident.

D.     The attacks, intimidation and threats against Members of the Press and owners of the media on December 17, 2001, and the following days


1.       Members of the press were attacked, threatened and intimidated on December 17 and the following days.

2.       The attacks, threats and acts of intimidation occurred with the tolerance of the Government.

3.       The persons responsible for those acts continue to enjoy immunity from prosecution by the investigative and judicial institutions of Haiti.

4.       As a result of the attacks, threats and acts of intimidation, many journalists have left the country.

5.       Because of these attacks, Freedom of Expression, the fundamental basis of democracy, has been seriously undermined.

E.  General

1.       The Commission concludes from the considerable evidence received that there is in Haiti a lack of responsive government, a politicized judicial system and a lack of respect for human and civil rights and the Rule of Law.

2.       The Commission was particularly struck by the weakness in the system of Governance in Haiti.  There appear to be little conformity with the Rule of Law, no respect for an independent Judiciary, and little regard for a competent law-enforcement system.  These are natural expectations in the rest of the region.

3.       There has been a heightened level of tension following the attacks of July 28 and December 17.  Those events have created a climate of distrust among Haitians, and particularly between supporters of Fanmi Lavalas, on the one hand, and supporters of the Opposition political parties, on the other.  This climate has not been helped by the decision taken by the Convergence to "elect" or choose its own "President of the Republic."  This distrust has also led to attacks and reprisals resulting in injuries, destruction, death and heightened suspicion.

4.       The impartiality of the judiciary is not always maintained.  This could result in deterioration in respect of the holders of this high office, especially if Judges are not seen as being able to punish unlawful acts committed by members of the Popular Organizations.  This has been recognized even in the highest quarters. "CARLI INFO" (the Journal of the Committee of Lawyers for the Respect of Individual Liberty, in its issue Number 17 of January 2002, on page 4) quotes the President of the Republic, Mr. Jean Bertrand Aristide, in the course of a speech delivered during the opening session of the 47th Legislature for the Year 2002, criticizing the state of the Haitian Judiciary and denouncing the impunity which has pervaded the country. He said "Our judicial system is sick, very sick, surrounded by impunity and corruption.  Often, it has been said, that the system does not render justice where justice is due *"

5.    The Judiciary is an independent arm of the State, which however requires the assistance of the Executive to enforce its decisions.  Failure to enforce judicial decisions in a timely manner, or at all, could threaten a fragile democracy and is certainly not conducive to its enhancement.

6.    Equally as important as the enforcement of judicial decisions is the determination to prosecute all offenders who violate the provisions of the law.  In particular, there seems to be a distinct lack of will in investigating and/or prosecuting members of Popular Organizations.

4.       In both cases the passivity of the authorities was
7.    Press freedom and the independence of the media are areas which need to be addressed urgently.

8.    The media acknowledge that press freedom exists only in so far as they are able to operate, but that their independence is threatened by both Government aggression and their heavy dependence on advertising revenue from the private sector whose members are mainly supporters of "Convergence".

9.       A number of issues relating to security in the country were raised before the Commission.  These include the uncontrolled operation of the Popular Organizations, the failure of the Government to respect and enforce the findings and judgments of the courts, and arbitrary and politically-motivated arrests and detention.  The Commission fears that if these matters are not addressed seriously they could complicate the search for a solution to the ongoing political crisis.

10.   The strident criticisms of the Police Force which were received from all sections of Haitian Society, including some of the high-ranking officers of the Police led the Commission to the inevitable conclusion that not only is the force undermanned and under-equipped but also that it lacks the motivation and determination to discharge its duties in a situation of crisis.  To these must be added a lack of direction and control, and excessive political interference in the management of the force.
For the Full report:http://www.oas.org/OASpage/Haiti_situation/cpinf4702_02eng.htm