15696: (Ives) The Hidden Wars of International Aid - Interviews with Ives, Blanchet & Maternowska (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: K. M. Ives <kives@toast.net>

This is a transcript of interviews broadcast on a Pacifica Radio Network
affiliate in California.

THE HIDDEN WARS OF INTERNATIONAL AID - THE CASE OF HAITI
Max Blanchet, Kim Ives, Catherine Maternowska, interviewed by Mark Schuller
Broadcast on Voices for Global Justice on April 15, 2003.

Even though ninety percent of citizens in Turkey did not want to allow
their sovereign soil used by the U.S. military for the recent war in Iraq,
the U.S. government was able to convince the Turkish government to allow
them to do so to the tune of sixteen billion dollars in international aid.
By contrast, countries like Haiti are in the opposite situation. Half a
billion dollars of already-approved loans have been frozen, pending
measures such as privatization and a resolution of a political impasse. The
current situation is complex, casting a long shadow of uncertainty on Haiti
's future, even as the people and government of Haiti prepare to celebrate
the bicentennial of its independence in 2004. Untangling these issues and
providing a perspective are Haitian journalist, Kim Ives, Haitian American
activist, Max Blanchet, and anthropologist and former NGO staff Catherine
Maternowska.

Kim Ives gives his interpretation of the political situation. Ives is a
journalist with a progressive alternative news weekly Haiti Progrès, which
is affiliated with the PPN, left-wing political party in Haiti.

IVES: What we see happening in Haiti today is very similar to what we see
happening in Venezuela, and what happened in the 1980s in Nicaragua. It is
a destabilization campaign being waged by Washington against president
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the means used to do this are familiar, as are
the authors of the campaign. We should remember that the crew that was in
power under Reagan who carried out the war against the Zandanistas included
people like Otto Reich, Bush's special envoy to Latin America, like Robert
Noriega, now the Assistant Secretary of State of Internal Affairs,
ambassador to the OAS. People like John Negroponte, the Ambassador to the
U.N. of the Bush Administration. These people are waging the war against
the Aristide government by means of a diplomatic offensive on one hand,
passing a number of OAS resolutions meddling, in fact, in Haiti's internal
affairs, which is a violation of the OAS charter. They have also launched a
media campaign where the mainstream media basically vilifies the Haitian
government, make it appear to be the aggressors, when in fact _they_ are.
There is a contra-force, which has been put together in the Dominican
Republic, where it has been waging a low-intensity war, striking against
Haitian police posts across the country.

SCHULLER: Ives also disagrees with OAS assessment of the current situation
and the election of May 2000.

IVES: The observer at the head of their mission, Orlando Marville, could
not challenge the participation and nature of the vote, but he challenged
the way in which second round contests were calculated. That is, the
Provisional Electoral Council used a formula that he did not agree with. He
made this an issue, to cast some sort of doubt on the election. It's a very
minor technical point. The opposition protested and boycotted [the
presidential] contest, even though it's clear to all observers of any merit
that it was simply because they did not stand a chance. The Aristide
government very unwisely accepted to allow the OAS to somehow intervene and
act as mediators in this electoral dispute. To us, that was completely
uncalled for. It was an internal matter. The CEP, which is the final
authority on the election, passed its verdict, end of story. The same way
the OAS was not invited to intervene in the U.S. elections after George
Bush was appointed by five members for the Supreme Court.

They don't of course at any point seek to look into the links of the
opposition to this contra force of which there are many indications that
links are there. No, their focus has been on the reaction of the masses.
There is no doubt that the Aristide government has been pushed increasingly
to the right, by this international pressure and this we could say is the
modus operandi of Aristide. He has a way of trying to maneuver by inviting
his enemies into his government and into his organization. In this way the
Lavalas movement originally founded in 1991 had a slogan, Makout pa ladan,
(makout-s are not involved), makout-s referring to thugs for years that
repressed and extorted money from the people. So this sector, this
arch-reactionary sector of Haitian society, was supposed to be marginalized
in the new Haiti. But in fact what Aristide did in the face of the
offensive was, rather than standing up and denouncing it, he would try to
integrate key players from the Duvalierist sector into his government. This
is what happened after he was reelected in 2001. He put in the key post of
Justice Ministry a guy called Gary Lissade, who had been a lawyer for the
putchists regime that governed Haiti for three years from ninety-one to
ninety-four, the military regime. He put in commerce ministry an indicted
embezzler, a guy called Théard, who under the Duvalier regime had basically
milked five million dollars from the nation's treasury. He put in Marc
Bazin in a ministerial post, the former World Bank official who had run
against Aristide and lost, at the behest of the United States. But given
the powers lined up against him, we feel we have to defend Artistide.

SCHULLER: Do you think that the current moves of the U.S. administration,
the current war with Iraq, has anything to do with international aid
policy? In places like Haiti, what effects do you think that it has? Or do
you see any parallels with the Iraqi situation now and Haiti, say in 1994?

IVES: Sure. It's a lot of the same dynamics that's used for any country
that is targeted. First there is a demonization campaign against the leader
of the regime. In the same way they made Saddam Hussein into some kind of
monster who was something short of a vampire. The same way they did that to
Quaddafi or Milosevic or Fidel Castro or Manuel Noriega. Whatever the flaws
any one of these leaders might have, the demonization campaign is key to
building U.S. public support for the offensive. So in the case of Haiti,
they tried to demonize Aristide as some sort of monster who is repressing
the press, sending his thugs throughout the country, beating up people, and
so forth. This takes a very complex situation, simplifies it, and
essentially makes it the opposite of what it is. The government is the
victim of a campaign that is being waged against it. Again, like in Iraq,
their goal is regime change and on March 27th the National Popular
Assembly, the PPN, which is perhaps the most progressive of the parties in
Haiti, held a march of some 3000 of its militants through the city and they
were joined by another five hundred to a thousand other sympathizers both
from the base of the Lavalas, the masses, as well as others. They rallied
in the downtown area, a place called Place d'Italien, and they marched up
the Harry Truman Boulevard in front of the U.S. Embassy shouting many
chants against the intervention in Iraq, and against U.S. meddling in
Haiti.

SCHULLER: So people were making the links between what was going on in Iraq
and what was going on at home?

IVES: They were indeed. And they were showing their opposition to U.S.
aggression in both countries. It's a response to terrorism that is being
waged against the poor. It was a very major march. It was interesting to
note that most of the right-wing press tried to boycott it, but that had a
tremendous impact in Haiti.


Max Blanchet is a Haitian American activist who lives in the
Berkeley/Oakland Area. He is on the board of two Haitian NGOs, Lambi Fund
and Fonkoze. He recalls his involvement with popular movement and offers
his analysis of the current situation with the popular movement in Haiti.

BLANCHET: I was among the group that was working with the United Nations
that were on its behalf, arranging for President Aristide to visit the Bay
Area on two occasions, organizing demonstrations on behalf of the
democratic movement in Haiti. We were very active and there were a number
of us involved here. Since the return of Aristide in '94, I think the
landscape has changed a fair amount. Certainly by '97-'98 the enthusiasm
for Haitian affairs fell considerably in the Bay Area, and that's probably
reflective of what's happened everywhere else in the Diaspora. I think
people were dismayed by the implosion of the Lavalas movement, the endless
infighting, the succession of crises in Haiti, and I think this has led to
a great deal of demobilization. Let's put it this way, there are a number
of people in the Bay Area that still actively support the Aristide
government, but I'm certainly not among them. Not that I'm working against
the government, but I've become very skeptical of the goings on in Haiti.

Some foreign assistance has had a negative impact on both the government
and Haitian society, and I personally do not favor that. However, there is
much more to the current situation than the current suspension of
international aid. I think there is much more to Haitian history than the
history of imperialism in Haiti. My disappointment with the Lavalas
government has to do with the fact that suddenly since 98-99, we've seen
the reemergence of the old Haitian demons, namely, corruption, the use of
violence as a means of settling political differences, the lackluster
economic performance of the government, the incoherence of its economic
policies, and to be quite frank about it, Aristide's own style of
government. Aristide is a populist in my opinion. Although there are good
aspects of populism, as we've seen in many instances in Latin American
history, there are dark aspects of populism in Haiti, and we now are
experiencing that. I think particularly on that point that we've seen a
weakening of the institutions, namely the police force, and the weakening
of the judicial system - which was very weak to start with - and this can
be attributed to, in my opinion, directly to policies pursued by the
government.

As for the popular movement, I think it's greatly weakened. People are
heartbroken because the movement is divided. You have certain elements of
it that support the government in power, but there are elements of it that
are part of the Convergence. So there's been that division within the
movement, and this division is affecting the grassroots sector all over
Haiti. I think the movement has been weakened by other factors as well, and
I can mention two of them very quickly. During the coup years, the
leadership of the movement was the target of the repression organized by
the military, and the leadership was hit very hard. In addition, a number
of these people were offered residency in the United States, which was a
way of undermining the movement. I believe this was done systematically and
this in turn led to a brain drain.

And in addition, many people left the popular grassroots movement to join
the government at the various times. The movement lost considerable
leadership in the process, the so-called popular organizations have been
really co-opted by the government itself. That effectively in the process,
the legitimate organizations have been marginalized. You don't have much of
a say. People used the local organizations to achieve their aims, but they
don't have any autonomy. They have become tools of the government. That's
the perspective of some people.

Catherine Maternowska is a medical anthropologist who has twenty years of
field experience in Haiti. She is also involved with the Lambi Fund,
initially as its director and now as a member of its board of directors.
She offers her statement on the popular movement, and the effect of
international aid to the current situation.

MATERNOWSKA: To compare now, I just got back from a trip. It's an
interesting question and quite difficult because I have a 20 year
perspective to draw on. I've watched the movement for quite some time now,
and things are pretty bad. I've been an anthropologist since 1984. Put
together, I have a twenty year perspective. When I first lived in Haiti the
movement was underground and that was 1984-1986. With the ousting of the
Duvalier dictatorship and family, that movement moved above ground, working
towards democracy from 1986-1991, which included the election of President
Aristide in 1990. And then, there was of course the repressive coup d'etat
era that followed from 1992-1994, and then the return of so-called
democracy when Aristide returned to Haiti, but on U.S. terms, not Haitian
terms, from 1994 to present. So there has been several different eras with
the movement in Haiti

I have to admit, right now it's not a very healthy situation. The reports
from the field when I was there indicated that the most dominating issue
for people is not so much the politics, but the socioeconomic situation.
The value of the Haitian gourde has diminished radically. Gas prices are
increasing and affecting transportation and everyone that uses
transportation, or linked to transportation, which includes marketing,
which is the backbone of the Haitian economy. Schooling, education, people
can't get to school. They now close the school doors and education doors so
that they are only teaching three days a week. Getting to the doctor,
health care, everything is affected by this devaluation of the gourde and
increasing gas prices. There's lots of malnutrition and related diseases
that's very devastating to the population.

There's strikes going on in the health care sector for higher wages. There'
s of course, university personnel, faculties of the university are
striking. In fact, there was a demonstration when I was in Haiti a few
weeks ago. And of course, all of the demonstrations are squashed by the
National Police. And there is not a lot of freedom of expression for
members of the movement or members trying to express some form of their
rights. So for the political situation, there are not a lot of positive
things happening lately. There are internal political conflicts that are
tearing the movement apart. The organizations around the country are very
discouraged. People working with the Lambi Fund report that groups are
breaking up, popular organizations are breaking up. Leadership is waning
for these organizations, and leadership is key to keeping people together.
A lot of people are applying for residence in other countries or are
leaving illegally, taking to the sea and migranting to the Dominican
Republic. So there is lack of community participation and effort. So the
outlook is really poor right now.

SCHULLER: So how are all these things connected?

MATERNOWSKA: Well, I think the problem is much more profound than that
focuses only on the macro politics of international aid. I think
international aid is critical, of course, for a country like Haiti. It's
unfortunate that there is dependence there, but I think that the more
pertinent issue is one of what the Haitians call the bourvesman of the
turning of things in Haiti. What I've heard is that the aid is just a
pretext for larger structural problems that are going on unaddressed and
have gone on unaddressed for years. But we seem to be hitting a crisis
point, from a lack of commitment and focus on these issues. And one of the
questions that a Haitian had said to me was, "Okay, so the international
aid comes back, but who's going to control it anyhow?" Which I thought was
a pretty good question.

SCHULLER: Can you give me an example of what are some of these structural
problems that exist, that this new round of international aid needs to
address, but maybe won't be able to?

MATERNOWSKA: First of all, international aid plays a small part in Haiti,
and it always has. And most Haitians who are politically aware and involved
in the movement know that aid is not going to fundamentally change anything
in Haiti. The Haitians that I work with are very clear they don't have what
they need: the support and infrastructure to control their own economy and
control their own politics. So I mean it's political, and it's economic.
Haiti needs agricultural production more than anything right now; they're
importing rice from Arkansas. So you know, another person has said that a
country can live on international aid, but I think referred to the need to
look internally and solve some problems. And I think aid is important
especially with health care, which are immediate concerns for people. But I
don't think it's the solution and I don't think it's the only problem
blocking Haiti's progress. Politics is like rather like opening XXX in
Baghdad or in Haiti, but I don't think that at this point that the
political involvement at the U.S. level or certainly for citizens is what's
important. In Haiti, there are lots of non-profits and non-governmental
organizations. They're not necessarily the answer. But they're just one
channel that happens to be functioning on some level right now, more than
other channels. I think that probably that if a citizen wanted to help
Haiti directly, channeling good will and good cash in Haiti would be wise
to look at organizations especially through grassroots organizing and those
could be Haitians or Canadians or American or French or whatever. But there
's an absence of government in Haiti that's an absence of a
well-functioning government and a government that can't function at full
speed now. That's the main thing for people to be aware of what's going on
in Haiti and trying to raise consciousness about the imbalance of resources
and the injustice that's going on and work to redress that either locally
or internationally. I think it's important that people remember Haiti now.
It's not an important piece of the media because of the situation globally
with the war and other issues. But there's a daily war going on in Haiti,
and it's a war of survival and human rights.