19171: Slavin: Heritage Foundation on Haiti (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: PSlavin@unicefusa.org

Subject: Heritage Foundation
www.heritage.org

Support Institutions, Not Despots in Haiti
by Stephen Johnson
WebMemo #431
February 24, 2004

It is time for Haiti to grow up. The culture of subjugation and rebellion
that has burned there since Haiti won independence from France 200 years
ago must be replaced by regular elections and public institutions. But as
long as the United States and the international community keep indulging
Haiti's political immaturity by supporting popular figures and then
intervening when they go bad, the country will never be self-governing.

Current Events

Pressure is mounting to rescue the current despot-President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide-from violent rebels who began taking over cities in the northern
half of the country on February 5. Haiti's National Police are powerless to
fight back because Aristide staffed it with partisan loyalists four years
ago, causing many professionally trained officers to quit.

On Saturday, February 21, the Bush Administration and other foreign
representatives met with Aristide, who promised to honor commitments made
to Caribbean leaders in January 2004 to free detained opposition figures,
disarm partisan gangs, reform the police, and work with opponents toappoint
a new prime minister and governing council that would include the
opposition.

But Aristide has a history of ignoring promises and is waiting for the
opposition to come to him. Absent immediate action on his part, the United
States and the international community should decide whether Haiti's
democracy has run off the rails and if so, support the restoration
ofdemocratic institutions under a process that allows Haitians to decide
who their leaders will be.

Here We Go Again

On February 17, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell hadgood reasons for
saying that "there is frankly no enthusiasm right now for sending in
military or police forces" to put down the rebellion. Previous
interventions have been ineffective and costly. For instance, U.S. Marines
putdown an uprising in 1915 and stayed for 19 years, but stable government
unraveled soon thereafter.

In 1986, the Reagan Administration urged dictator Jean Claude Duvalier to
step down after his misrule led to rebellion. A coup sent him into exile
and, the next year, Haiti adopted its first truly democratic constitution.
But in 1990, Haitians elected fiery ex-priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He
called on violent street gangs known as chimeres to pursue political rivals
and, in less than a year, his administration collapsed into chaosand
violence. His own security chief, General Raoul Cedras, replaced him with a
military junta.
As an elected leader, Aristide was awarded gilded exile by the U.S. and
allowed to draw on Haiti's frozen U.S. bank accounts. According to former
U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Lawrence Pezzullo, Aristide used someof the money
to lobby Congress to help restore his presidency. Aristide then blocked
efforts to negotiate with Haiti's military rulers and local members of
parliament, thus giving them an excuse not to accept him back. Blinded by
Aristide's lobbying campaign and mounting Congressional pressure to do
something, the Clinton Administration opted to invade Haiti in 1994.

It was then-U.S. Army General Colin Powell who accompanied former President
Jimmy Carter to restore Aristide to power at a cost of about $3 billion and
a commitment of 20,000 troops.

Back in office, Aristide repaid the high-level favor by reuniting his
violent supporters and ruling like the dictators who preceded him.

Few Alternatives

Whether to support Aristide again is a tough call. He isan elected
official, despite the flawed contest in November 2000 that returned him to
office with less than three percent of the electorate participating.
Promoting his early departure would weaken Haiti's tenuous hold on
consitutional order. On the other hand, his regime is hardly a democracy.
Haiti does not now have a sitting legislature or an independent judiciary,
and so the president rules by decree. Few other public institutions
function and some state employees are reportedly paid with drug trafficking
profits.

Second, the rebels who may topple Aristide are former supporters who think
they no longer need him. Pressured by the Organization ofAmerican States to
improve his human rights record, Aristide began cutting links to them last
year. Now, gangs like the Gonaives-based Cannibal Army have formed fronts
that have taken over northern Haiti. Mixed in are death squad leaders and
members of Haiti's disbanded military with whom Aristide oncemade temporary
alliances.

Weakest of all, and least heard above the din, are peaceful opponents who
come from more than 300 fragmented groups known as the Democratic
Convergence. They have yet to coalesce around specific solutions
andleaders. But they are Haiti's best hope of restoring democracy.

No Faith in Bad Faith

Tired of Aristide's broken promises, the non-violent Democratic Convergence
has refused to negotiate with the president. They remember that he had to
be talked out of staying beyond his first term which endedin 1995. He
promised to help the downtrodden, but even with massive aid from the United
States, Canada, and France, Haiti is poorer and more violent today than
ever before.

Under Aristide's Lavalas Party rule, outside electoral assistance never led
to a permanent voter registry or to any other electoral infrastructure. All
elections from 1997 forward were manipulated to various degrees by Lavalas,
even though most of its candidates had enough votes to win.

Under Aristide's 1995 successor, President René Préval, the United States
and Canada trained a professional 6,000-man national police. But when
Aristide returned to office in 2000, he appointed partisan loyalists to key
positions, demoralizing the police force and turning it intolittle more
than an escort service for his own mobs. Half of those professionally
trained resigned; others were replaced.

After the Clinton Administration suspended direct assistance to Haiti's
government, President Aristide made an eight-point promise to correct
previous flawed parliamentary elections, respect human rights, andform an
administration including opposition parties. He also agreed to two
resolutions from the Organization of American States to prosecute
human-rights abusers and establish a climate of security. Aristide did
little to keep these commitments.

As peaceful protests reached a crescendo in January 2004, Aristide told
leaders of the 15-member Caribbean Community that he would disarm partisan
gangs, reform the police, and work with non-violent opponentsto appoint a
new prime minister and governing council that includes the opposition as a
basis to elect new members of parliament, whose terms had all lapsed. Days
passed with no action until violence broke out on February 5.

Help, with Strings Attached

The United States and other foreign parties deserve credit for wanting to
help resolve the crisis. But doing so will require long-term involvement,
not a quick fix. Meeting with President Aristide Saturday, February 21,
diplomats from the United States, Canada, France, the Organization of
American States, and the Caribbean Community got him to agree to a
newcabinet and to allow an independent Haitian commission to select a new
prime minister-similar to what Aristide promised Caribbean leaders in
January. And if these concessions were to persuade opponents to stop
calling for the president's resignation, delegation nations would consider
sending troops to back-up Haiti's hapless police force.

But business leaders, student groups, and political rivals have shown
little patience for a recommitment to past promises made and ignored.
Moreover, the February 21 proposal failed to provide for their safety or
guarantee that Aristide wouldn't go back on his word.

Propping up Aristide is a bad idea. It will neither restore democracy nor
keep the peace. The United States and its allies would be better off urging
him to resign. If they insist on a power sharing proposal,they must impose
significant constraints on Aristide's authority and behavior while adding
protection for members of the democratic opposition.

In any case, the international community should be readyto help
representatives of all Haiti's political parties form an interim governing
council to arrange for fresh elections as soon as possible. These should be
conducted by the Organization of American States until local capacity and
competency permits a handover. To ensure accountability of aid, donor
nations should form a supervisory council to channel assistance and ensure
that it is used by the state only for intended purposes until responsible
government and free markets emerge. Meanwhile, allegations against Aristide
of human rights abuse and drug trafficking should be investigated.

The entire process could take a decade or more. Is it inAmerica's interest?
Barely, but over the long term, democratic stability inour hemisphere is
cheaper than blow ups and bailouts.

Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.

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