19659: orenstein: nyt op-ed: "in haiti, mobs are the easy part" (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: katie orenstein <katie@orenstein.com>

In Haiti, Mobs Are the Easy Part
By KENNETH L. CAIN

Published: March 2, 2004

George Bates

NY Times Op-Ed - March 2, 2004
In Haiti, Mobs Are the Easy Part
By Kenneth L. Cain,


It was June 1995, and I was standing beside a nervous Jordanian police
officer in the doorway of a dusty, sweltering office as a gang of drunken
Haitian thugs moved slowly up the porch stairs toward us, angry and
menacing. The young Jordanian and I had been sent to the town of Corail, on
Haiti's southwest coast, by the United Nations as observers for ongoing
parliamentary elections. Haiti had been on edge in the eight months since
20,000 American troops deposed the military regime of Raoul Cedras and
returned President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from exile the year before.

All that day we had been overseeing a sub-regional clearing house where
ballots (some of which were brought in from rural polling stations by
donkey) were to be boxed, officially sealed and shipped elsewhere for final
tabulation. But as we packed up dozens of overflowing ballot boxes, the gang
of local men had slowly formed outside, drinking moonshine, dancing and
chanting anti-Aristide slogans. Worried that they might attack the office, I
radioed the United States Special Forces team deployed in our sector.

This was a squad of only 11 American soldiers, but their hilltop
headquarters in a modest Haitian home projected power and security
throughout Grand Anse province. So did their Humvees, Zodiac watercraft,
M-16's - and their stunningly intimidating discipline. While larger,
lumbering regular Army units were also valuable, in my experience it was
these 1,100 Special Forces troops, deployed in 27 Haitian towns and cities,
that played the major role in maintaining order and suppressing paramilitary
groups' efforts to derail democracy.

In my experience, most of Haiti's paramilitary thugs had a coward's courage:
armed with baseball bats, amulets, bellies full of cane liquor and the
occasional pistol, a small group could terrorize an unarmed village - or an
election office. But if just a couple of helmeted Americans appeared in full
Kevlar, fingers poised on the trigger guards of their M-16's, the thugs
would invariably smile, nod and melt away. It was an inspiring drama, and it
played out daily across the region.

Unfortunately, it was not going to occur on the steps of that building in
Corail. The voice on the other end of the radio had told me that all members
of the Special Forces unit were confronting similar crises at other polling
sites, and would not be able to help for several hours - could I hold out
that long?

So the Jordanian police officer and I did the only thing we could: we stood
side-by-side at the front door, feigning determination to protect it at all
costs. Soon enough, the crowd, about 50 strong, approached us and ascended
the porch stairs. Then came a slow, relentless surge forward. The officer
and I looked at each other and at the antiquated six-shooter pistol he
carried at his hip, shrugged, and stepped aside.

The gang members shouted with glee, rushed into the building, threw all the
ballot boxes and wooden furniture through the windows and then rushed back
out to make a bonfire. There was nothing to do but stand and watch - there
was no effective Haitian police force or any other civic body to turn to.
The men danced and sang and drank cane liquor and poured it on the fire,
while the region's uncounted ballots turned to a pile of smoldering ash.

A decade later, similar gangs have plunged the entire country into anarchy.
Fortunately, if belatedly, United States Marines are arriving on Haitian
soil. But as the details of their mission are being planned, it is essential
that we remind ourselves of one big lesson of 1995: a small but potent
American military force can be remarkably effective. It would be overly
cautious to limit the Marines to an unambitious stabilization exercise in
the capital, Port-au-Prince. Relatively few of them could restore order to
all major population centers. There are likely just a few hundred Haitian
rebels with serious arms; they are poorly equipped and undisciplined. They
are no match and have no stomach for confrontation with even a small
contingent of Marines. We can calm Haiti quickly and relatively easily.