19743: radtimes: A Typical American Coup (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: radtimes <resist@best.com>

A Typical American Coup

http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/16872/1.html

by John Horvath
02.03.2004

When it comes to removing heads of state by indirect means, the US still
has what it takes to get the job done

Jean Bertrand Aristide has finally fled Haiti -- again. Meanwhile, the
mainstream press the world over focuses on the anarchy that has engulfed
the tiny Caribbean nation. Yet most reports merely skim the surface. There
was talk of rebel advances, people with guns, looting, revenge attacks,
etc. What was missing was one simple question: what was the uprising all
about? Perhaps the reason why journalists, especially those from the US and
other "allied" countries, failed to dig deep into what was going on is
because they know what they would find: that the US was behind the ugly
overthrow of a democratically elected government, a move akin to the Iraq
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Some might argue that this comparison is going a bit too far. But is it?
With the exception that there isn't oil in Haiti and that Kuwait is not a
democracy, the American power grab in Haiti is no different than what
Saddam attempted to do in the Middle East. In both cases, a bullying state
regards itself as the region's de-facto superpower, and feels that it has a
right to assume control, either directly (as Iraq did in 1990) or
indirectly (as the US has just done).

American tampering in Haiti is quite obvious. Before the violence erupted,
the Bush administration was in full support of the opposition, and have
been trying to force Aristide to share power. As frustration over the
political stalemate escalated and the rebels took to the streets, the US
simply stood by and watched, refusing to help calm the situation in any
way. The goal of the White House was simple: to have Aristide removed from
power at whatever cost, even if meant allowing the country to descend into
civil war. So much for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as was
used in such far away places as Kuwait and Bosnia.

An Ignominious Tradition

When one looks back at the history of Haiti, one can fully understand the
motives driving US foreign policy toward the tiny Caribbean nation. It was
the leading target of US intervention in the 20th century. In 1919, Woodrow
Wilson had Haiti occupied, restored slavery, overthrew the parliamentary
system, and basically turned it into a US plantation. Ever since then, the
US has supported brutal dictators -- all of whom never had an embargo on
them no matter how many atrocities they carried out.

Ironically, this year is the bicentennial anniversary of the nation's
declaration of independence. Yet Haitians have little reason to celebrate.
Haiti was once the richest colony in the Western Hemisphere; now it's the
most impoverished. US foreign policy is the main reason for Haiti's
perpetual state of poverty, especially the recent refusal to lend funds to
the fledgling democracy, which was held back because of "election
problems". In other words, Haiti hasn't met the US standard for democracy.
In reality, Haiti's idea of democracy runs up against the US idea of a
top-down democracy, run by an elite.

The problems Haiti is now going through all started with an election in
1990 which turned out the wrong way. The US was certain that their
candidate would win, but out of the woodwork came a populist priest who won
because he focused on things in the country that no one else was paying
attention to.

Aristide's landslide victory in December 1990 took the US and most western
countries completely by surprise. He was swept into power by a network of
popular grassroots organizations which outside observers weren't even aware
of. This did not fit the top-down democracy model the US wanted, so
financial support was subsequently withdrawn. Yet with a solid two-thirds
of the vote which demolished America's favourite, a former World Bank
official named Marc Bazin (who received just 14%), the US was in a
predicament: how were they going to get rid of Aristide who has popular
support?

This problem became more acute when in the first seven months of Aristide's
term he introduced progressive reforms. He was able to reduce corruption
extensively, and to trim a highly bloated state bureaucracy. He won a lot
of international praise for this, even from the World Bank and IMF, which
were offering him loans and preferential terms because they liked what he
was doing. Furthermore, he cut back on drug trafficking. The flow of
refugees to the US virtually stopped as atrocities were reduced to way
below what they had been.

It goes without saying that all this made Aristide even more unacceptable
in the eyes of the US. Finally, on September 30, 1991 a coup was staged to
oust Aristide from power. In its aftermath, the first Bush administration
focused attention on Aristide's alleged atrocities and undemocratic
activities, downplaying the major atrocities which followed the coup.
Naturally, the media went along with this; while people were getting
slaughtered in the streets of Port-au-Prince, the media concentrated on
alleged human rights abuses under the Aristide government.

Refugees soon started fleeing again, because the situation was
deteriorating rapidly. The first Bush administration instituted a blockade
to send them back. Within a couple of months, the first Bush administration
also had undermined an embargo put in place by the Organization of American
States (which the US supposedly supported) by allowing US-owned companies
to simply ignore it. The New York Times called this "fine-tuning" the
embargo to improve the restoration of democracy. Eventually, Marc Bazin,
the US candidate, was in power as prime minister, with the ruling generals
behind him.

During the Clinton years, not much changed in Haiti. Although Clinton
attacked the first Bush administration for its inhumane policy of returning
refugees, which was a clear violation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, he did little to change it. Indeed, some charge that he promoted it
even further.

Ultimately, there was substantial international pressure to have Aristide
returned to power. Not only this, but Clinton came up with a shrewd plan to
undermine his political opponents at home, who wanted Aristide to stay out,
while at the same time elevate his reputation on the international stage.
Aristide would be returned to power but on very strict conditions; namely,
that he accept the policies of the candidate the US had supported in the
1990 Haitian election.

The pig fiasco

In effect, Aristide was to accept a neo-liberalist program which would open
Haiti up to what is known as "market forces". For example, Haitian rice
producers would have to compete with US agribusiness, which happens to be
very highly subsidized. As a result, Haiti, a starving island, ended up
exporting 35 times more food to the US under Clinton than it did under the
first Bush.

Many Haitians are well aware of the effects of globalisation on their
country. Haiti's first traumatic experience of globalization was with the
extermination of their Creole pigs. The experience left such an impression
that whenever peasants are told that "economic reform" and privatisation
will benefit them, they shake their heads and remember the pig fiasco.

Haiti's small, black, Creole pigs were at the heart of the peasant economy.
An extremely hearty breed, well adapted to Haiti's climate and conditions,
they ate readily available waste products, and could survive for three days
without food. Eighty to 85 percent of rural households raised pigs; they
played a key role in maintaining the fertility of the soil. Traditionally,
a pig was sold to pay for emergencies and special occasions (funerals,
marriages, illnesses), and, critically, to pay school fees and buy books
for when school opened each year in October.

In 1982 international agencies assured Haiti's peasants that their pigs
were sick and had to be killed so that the illness would not spread
elsewhere. Promises were made that better pigs would replace the sick pigs.
Within 13 months, all of Haiti's Creole pigs were killed.

Two years later, the new, "better" pigs came from Iowa. Yet they required
clean drinking water (unavailable to 80 percent of the population),
imported feed ($90 a year when per capita income was about $130), and
special roofed pigpens. Haitian peasants quickly dubbed them four-footed
princes. Adding insult to injury, most found that the meat didn't taste so
good.

Needless to say, the program was a complete failure. One observer of the
process estimated that in monetary terms, Haitian peasants lost $600
million. There was a 30 percent drop in enrollment in rural schools, a
dramatic decline in protein consumption in rural Haiti, a devastating
decapitalisation of the peasant economy, and an incalculable negative
impact on Haiti's soil and agricultural productivity. Aristide contends
that Haiti's peasantry hasn't recovered from the pig fiasco to this day.

Endgame

Although Aristide was back in power by the mid-1990s, the Americans
appeared less worried about him this time round. For one, the White House
received international praise for "restoring democracy", which helped to
further Clinton's image as a global peacemaker (which ultimately failed in
the Mid-East). Meanwhile, the long-term effect of the reign of terror in
Haiti destroyed domesticate aspirations and made people believe there was
no alternative. Hence, the lively, vibrant civil society based on
grassroots organizations that had brought Aristide to power was so
decimated upon his return that he didn't have the kind of popular support
he once had to do anything.

Still, Aristide tried to make the best of a bad situation. Given his
predicament, the US doubted that he would be able to do well in the 2000
elections, that his base of support had been either terrified into silence
or disillusioned. Nevertheless, despite these handicaps, Aristide was able
to pull off a victory, although some senatorial seats were in dispute.

Meanwhile, the US was also undergoing its own election with results just as
questionable, if not more so, than in Haiti. With the second Bush
administration came a harder line against the tiny Caribbean nation (not to
mention the rest of the world). The first Bush administration never
supported the return of Aristide, and now since many of the players from
the first Bush administration were also in the second Bush administration,
Aristide's days were numbered.

Shortly before 9/11 at a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) meeting
held at Quebec City, the US forced through a resolution whereby future FTAA
member countries would have to observe "democratic norms." This, in effect,
allowed the US to intensify pressure on Haiti, whose was out of favor in
Washington.

Still not satisfied, in 2003 the US government vetoed the delivery of $500
million in approved aid loans to Haiti from the Inter American Development
Bank. These loans were earmarked specifically for improving education,
health, and clean water. The loans were withheld because the US government
claimed that the votes for 8 senate seats were not counted properly in the
May 2000 Haitian elections. This, despite the fact that all senators
involved resigned their seats.

With another election year looming in the US, more pressure on Haiti was
exerted. Not satisfied with constantly fulfilling the petty demands that
Washington imposed, the US decided to apply its full might on Haiti by
telling Aristide to "broaden his government in the interests of democracy."
In other words, the Bush administration was telling the Aristide government
that it had the wrong base of support, and must change it to one that
Washington sees fit. After finally running out of patience at Aristide's
determination and ability to hold on to power, rebel elements supported by
the US decided to launch an uprising. The US, as well as the western world,
simply turned the other way.

The coup in Haiti wasn't the first such American-sponsored coup of this
century, nor will it be the last. The American Empire profits from war and
human misery, and coup-plotters are forever active attempting to terminate
democracy and replace it with a neo-liberalist, corporate state. What was
important about this latest coup in Haiti is that it helped Washington to
regain a sense of confidence in its use of subversive political methods.
Ever since the coup fiasco in Venezuela a few years back, some have
wondered whether the Bush administration has what it takes to carry on a
long and bloody American tradition. With Aristide now gone, it looks as
though it has.

.