20395: Esser: How Involved Was the United States in the Removal of Aristide? (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: D. Esser torx@joimail.com

Power and Interest News Report
http://www.pinr.com/

15 March, 2004

''How Involved Was the United States in the Removal of Aristide?''

Within hours after deposed Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide
arrived in exile in the Central African Republic, questions were
raised about U.S. complicity in his removal from power. Speaking to
reporters, Aristide stated,

During the night of the 28th of February 2004, there was a coup
d'etat. One could say that it was a geo-political kidnapping. … The
28th of February, at night, suddenly, American military personnel who
were already all over Port-au-Prince descended on my house in Tabarre
to tell me … the foreigners and Haitian terrorists alike, loaded with
heavy weapons, were already in position to open fire on
Port-au-Prince. And right then, the Americans precisely stated that
[the rebels] will kill thousands of people and it will be a
bloodbath. That the attack is ready to start, and when the first
bullet is fired nothing will stop them and nothing will make them
wait until they take over, therefore the mission is to take me dead
or alive.

Based upon Aristide's statement, and the actual events that took
place on the ground in Haiti, Washington was certainly involved in
the coup d'etat that removed the democratically elected Haitian
leader from power; the issue at hand is how involved. It is not clear
what level of communication existed between Washington and the rebel
leaders. What is clear, however, is that Washington tacitly approved
of the rebels' actions since the United States did nothing to prevent
their rapid military gains.

Throughout the conflict that would eventually remove Aristide from
power, the Bush administration distanced itself from the Haitian
leader. This fact alone clearly shows that the Bush administration
did not consider Aristide's governmental policies to be in the
interests of the United States. Had Aristide's policies coincided
with U.S. interests, Washington would have no doubt intervened to
help preserve his fragile rule.

Even if the United States would have been unwilling to send in a
token force of troops to help buoy Aristide's government -- a
deployment that would have used up minimal resources and would have
had a tremendous depressing effect on the will of the rebel forces --
Washington could have at least made a public pronouncement that the
United States would not accept a change of government in
Port-au-Prince and that it would stand behind the country's
democratically elected leader.

Instead, Washington did very little. At first, the Bush
administration tried to coax the Democratic Platform -- an umbrella
group of Aristide's political opponents -- and the rebel leaders into
signing a proposal that would have incorporated them into the Haitian
government but would have left Aristide as the country's head until
the end of his constitutionally mandated term. The opposition and the
rebel leaders balked at the United States' suggestion, since they
knew all along that the U.S. must have been more than willing to
support a change of government in Haiti as long as that change didn't
create unacceptable levels of instability and violence in the country.

After the Democratic Platform and the rebel leaders rejected the
United States' proposal, the Bush administration released a statement
that, rather than support Aristide's rule, blamed him for the
uprising that was rapidly usurping the power of the elected president
of the country. The statement read, "This long-simmering crisis is
largely of Mr. Aristide's making. … His own actions have called into
question his fitness to continue to govern Haiti. We urge him to
examine his position carefully, to accept responsibility, and to act
in the best interests of the people of Haiti." In the end, Washington
acted in what it considered were the best interests of the United
States, and, perhaps in the minds of administration policymakers, the
people of Haiti.

Washington's final decision involved sending an armed security
element to Aristide's place of residence, advising him that the
United States would do nothing to preserve his rule, and if he did
not accept Washington's offer of safe haven out of Haiti, the United
States would stand by as rebel forces stormed Port-au-Prince, a
situation that would have likely led to bloodshed in the streets
coupled with Aristide's death.

It was the failure of the United States to support Aristide that has
led to his frequent statements that Washington was involved in the
coup that overthrew his rule. While it is unknown what connection
Washington had with the Democratic Platform and the rebel leaders, it
is known that Washington decided its interests would best be served
if Aristide were removed from power. The moment that Aristide agreed
to leave Haiti, the White House released a statement that U.S.
Marines would be sent to the island country to preserve order, foster
stability, and help set up a new government there. Indeed, as Vice
President Dick Cheney, speaking to CNN shortly after Aristide's
flight to exile, stated, "I'm happy he's gone."

Report Drafted By:
Erich Marquardt

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