20503: Esser: We should have done more to save Haiti from rebellion (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: D. Esser torx@joimail.com

The Globe and Mail
http://www.theglobeandmail.com

Mar. 17, 2004

We should have done more to save Haiti from rebellion
By PAUL KNOX

Realistically, could Canada have done anything on its own to prevent
the triumph of armed rebellion in Haiti and the overthrow of
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide?

I think the answer is probably no. It pains me to say so, because as
readers know, I believe the actions of the Canadian government and
others over the past few weeks made a mockery of their solemn
pronouncements on democratic rule in the Americas.

But politically and militarily, it's unlikely this country could have
made the commitment that would have been needed to spearhead a
maverick Haiti initiative, and sustain it for the necessary length of
time.

Whether or not you call what happened to Mr. Aristide a coup d'état,
there's no question that he left Haiti under extreme duress. He faced
a military insurrection led by people considered beyond the pale by
the entire diplomatic community. His political opponents supported
the rebellion tacitly -- and possibly, in some cases, materially.

Mr. Aristide accepted the stringent conditions laid down by Canada,
France, the United States and other nations in return for political
support. But these countries then failed to take the logical next
step of offering police or military support to his government against
the rebels. Since Haiti has no army and its police are ineffective,
this failure sealed Mr. Aristide's fate.

Canada's ex post facto rationalization of this sorry tale is
disingenuous. "No country with military capacity was willing to act,"
Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham told the House of Commons last
week. He went on to say no one "should have acted, in the absence of
political conditions in Haiti that would have both ensured the
success of the mission and reduced the risks . . ."

Yet it was the conduct of countries with superior military capacity
that ensured that the political conditions would never exist for
intervention to protect Mr. Aristide. On Feb. 21, Mr. Aristide agreed
to an internationally constructed power-sharing plan with strict
conditions attached. But his political opponents rejected the plan,
and their intransigence was rewarded. First the French Foreign
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, and then the U.S. Secretary of
State, Colin Powell, said it was time to open a new chapter in
Haiti's history -- one without Mr. Aristide.

Denis Coderre, the federal cabinet minister responsible for relations
with the Francophonie group of nations, made an even less tenable
argument to the House. He said sending muscle-power to Haiti to
forestall the rebel advance would have placed Canada and other
countries "on the president's side."

Can this be the same Denis Coderre who went to Port-au-Prince as part
of the foreign delegation that wrung that commitment out of Mr.
Aristide? Repeatedly and emphatically, he told reporters in Haiti
that Mr. Aristide was the country's legitimate president. Yet if that
was true, he was also a legitimate president under siege by a band of
outlaws.

By sending troops to Haiti, the foreign powers would have been taking
sides, all right -- in favour of peaceful dialogue under
international constraints instead of violent overthrow, and in favour
of their own power-sharing proposal. Instead, they effectively gave a
veto to a band of armed thugs and scofflaws, and signalled to the
non-violent opposition that its stand-pat tactics would succeed.

When the French and the Americans gave up on Mr. Aristide, should
Canada have acted by itself? Militarily, the rebels weren't much -- a
couple of hundred gangsters and former soldiers, most armed with
vintage rifles and shotguns. (I asked one of them what kind of weapon
he was carrying; he had to consult one of his comrades before
answering.) A few hundred ostentatiously armed troops would have been
enough to stall the rebel advance on Port-au-Prince.

But consider the difficulties. First of all, it's taken nearly two
weeks for the Canadian Forces to start getting that contingent into
Haiti. Second, the commitment would have had to be for two years --
enough for Mr. Aristide to serve out his term and hold elections.
Third, the initial effect would have been to freeze the status quo of
late February, dividing Haiti into a rebel-controlled north and a
government-controlled south. (A much larger force would have been
needed to force rebels to lay down their arms throughout the
country.) It would be a brave Canadian government indeed that would
mount such an expedition alone.

What Canada could have done, in that tumultuous week before Mr.
Aristide was flown out of Haiti, is speak out. A strong, independent
statement of support for constitutional rule might have galvanized
support at the United Nations for intervention. At the very least,
Mr. Graham might have said frankly that he had argued the case with
Mr. de Villepin and Mr. Powell and had not prevailed, and that Canada
would not or could not undertake intervention by itself.

That would have had the virtue of consistency and logic. I suspect it
might even be close to the truth. pknox@globeandmail.ca

 © 2004 Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc.
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