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21038: Esser: Don't reinstate army (fwd)




From: D. Esser torx@joimail.com

The Miami Herald
http://miami.com

April 02, 2004

HAITI
Don't reinstate army
BY OSCAR ARIAS

The Haitian army was abolished nine years ago during a period of
democratic transition precisely to prevent the country from falling
back into the hands of military men. Now that the U.S. Marines have
made the commendable decision to disarm rebel and pro-Aristide
militants alike, the Haitian people desperately need the
international community to ensure that it finishes the job.

Like so many Third World countries, Haiti has suffered not only from
a lack of national security in the sense of borders and territorial
integrity but also an ongoing crisis of human security, the right of
each person to live in peace and with the guarantee of basic rights
such as food, healthcare, education and citizenship. The army, long
an instrument of suppressive authoritarian regimes, has historically
deprived Haitians of these fundamental rights.

Predatory role

Isolated and destitute, Haitians have been terrorized not only by
military violence but also by its accompanying legacy of poverty. In
the late 1980s, the army consumed approximately 40 percent of the
national budget even as hunger and AIDS decimated the population.
Haiti could count on one soldier for every 1,000 citizens, and 1.5
doctors for every 10,000.

The 1991 coup against Haiti's first democratically elected president
was definitive proof of the army's predatory role. Even though the
1994 agreement returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office called for
a reduction of the army from 7,500 to 1,500 troops, a force that size
was still a clear threat to democratic governance. In 1995, I visited
Haiti to discuss with Aristide the benefits of doing away with the
army entirely. He readily agreed that the army was a problem but
doubted that he would have the political mandate to tackle it.

Since Aristide said that he could not abolish the army without the
support of the Haitian people, the Arias Foundation for Peace and
Human Progress commissioned an independent polling firm to gauge
popular support for the idea. The results were stunning: 62 percent
of Haitians were strongly in favor of abolition, and only 12 percent
were against.

These figures were key in convincing Aristide that demilitarization
was an idea whose time had come. He cut the army's funding and set in
motion a legislative process to have the abolition of the army
enshrined in Haiti's constitution. In 1996, when I visited Haiti for
the inauguration of presidential successor René Préval, Aristide
happily noted that of the 7,500-man army, the only ones still on the
government payroll were 20 marching-band musicians.

Duties of civil defense

After the troops were disbanded, the next steps to consolidate the
rule of law were clear: The population needed to be disarmed;
death-squad leaders and army generals had to be brought to justice;
and the police force required restructuring and professional training
to take on the duties of civil defense. The abolition of the army was
thus designed to complement larger nation-building initiatives
developed in conjunction with the United Nations, the Organization of
American States and the U.S. government.

But after a brief period of support after the U.S. occupation in
1994, the international community essentially left Haiti to work out
its problems alone. The aid squeeze following the contested 2000
elections caused an implosion of the Haitian economy and a consequent
crisis of governance.

Armed opposition groups of former soldiers reconstituted themselves
both in Haiti and in the neighboring Dominican Republic. Aristide's
response to his predicament was disappointing, if not predictable.
With his power threatened, he encouraged the formation of
pro-government gangs. The chiméres also attacked students and
peaceful demonstrators, a chilling echo of the army's former role.

But it would be wrong to interpret Haiti's current crisis as proof
that the original decision to demilitarize was a mistake. The
abolition of the army makes as much sense today as it did in 1995.

Repressive institution

It was never expected that the abolition of the army would
immediately bring peace and development to Haiti. In the absence of
economic development and political stability, no single reform is
capable of rescuing a failing state. Nonetheless, the greatest
achievement of Haiti's first democratic government was the removal of
that repressive and unjust institution.

Were the international community now to stand by as the rebels
reinstated the army, it would surely destroy the seeds of peace and
self-rule that have been planted with great sacrifice by the Haitian
people.

Oscar Arias, a former president of Costa Rica, is the 1987 Nobel
Peace laureate.
.

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