23002: Brown: Haitian Politics, Governance & Extenal Actors (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: "Brown, Stephen D. MR." <brownst@soc.mil>

HAITIAN POLITICS, GOVERNANCE & EXTERNAL ACTORS
A Current Trends Assessment
Remarks delivered by
Dr. Robert Maguire
Trinity College, Washington DC
at the conference
"Haitian Development and Public Policy: The Next Decade"
held at the University of Massachusetts in Boston on July 24, 2004

Over the past week, three highly contrasting developments related to current
trends in Haiti occurred. First, at a meeting of international multilateral
and bilateral
donors hosted in Washington by the World Bank, pledges for the amount of
$1.075
billion were made in support of the interim Haitian government toward the
reconstruction
and development of Haiti over the next two years. Among the leading pledges
were
those of the United States ($230 million), the European Union ($225
million), the Inter-
American Development Bank ($260 million), the World Bank ($150 million),
Canada
($112 million), and France ($92.8 million). Added to $440,000 of
multilateral funds
already in the interim government's pipeline, a total of $1.5 billion has
been promised to
assist Haiti meet various pressing needs between now and September 2006.1
The second, and somewhat contrasting, development over the past week was the
release of yet another human rights report detailing the continuation of
violence and
abuse, largely directed toward supporters and members of the disposed
government and
the former ruling Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party. Issued by the Institute for
Justice and
Democracy in Haiti, this latest report builds upon similar findings issued
in late June by
Amnesty International.2
The third, and highly contrasting development was the publication of an
article
entitled "The other regime change: Did the Bush administration allow a
network of rightwing Republicans to foment a violent coup in Haiti," on the
web-based journal,
salon.com. 3 At a time when many are focused on Haiti's ability to move
forward, this
investigative piece shedding light on events leading to the departure from
Haiti of its
elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as part of a longer-term political
operation
linked to a partisan think tank based in Washington, DC, underscores the
necessity of
continuing critical assessments of current US policy toward Haiti.
With apologies to Hollywood, I would characterize these three developments
as "the
good, the bad and the ugly." As such they are indicative of current,
conflicting trends
that characterize Haiti and its international relations today. Allow me to
elaborate.

THE GOOD
The pledge of $1.08 billion, added to some $440 million on hand, that
provides
Haiti with some $1.5 billion in aid over the next 2 years is good, without
doubt, in view
of Haiti's myriad problems. It is somewhat ironic, however, that this new
round of
international aid has been pledged following a period when the country's
serious social,
economic, and political problems were exacerbated by a politically-driven
embargo of
international assistance to Haiti's government over the previous four years.
The
suspension of US bilateral assistance, in particular, actually began in the
late 1990's,
when various conditionalities placed on the aid effectively limited
everything save that
disbursed in support of the Haitian Coast Guard.4
Funding pledged by international donors will support the following four
broad
themes of a transition strategy hastily devised by the interim government:
* Strengthen political governance and promote national dialogue;
* Strengthen economic governance and contribute to institutional
development;
* Promote economic recovery;
* Improve access to basic service.
International expectations of what its funding will do have been outlined in
the
following summary included in a press release issued by the United Nations
even prior to
the donor's conference, indicating significant donor involvement in the
planning process:
"By September 2006, at the end of the Interim Framework for Cooperation's
(IFC) life span, Haiti will hopefully have, among other things, 500,000 new
jobs
(30 percent of them for women), 6,000 trained police, round-the-clock
electricity
in Port-au-Prince, water and sanitation service for 100,000 people in
disadvantaged neighborhoods, 1,500 newly rehabilitated schools, garbage
collection in one-quarter of the slums; 10,000 upgraded housing units in the
slums, and 2,000 new housing units there."5
Donor decisions to pledge large sums to the interim government were largely
attributed to a positive response to - and faith in - that government,
citing its apolitical,
technocratic profile, well-developed plans, and anti-corruption pledges.
Heavy US and
French arm-twisting also helped to stimulate donor enthusiasm.
While donor response was positive, however, others, including some of the
international press, responded a bit more cautiously. The New York Times,
for example,
in a July 23rd editorial pointed out that "Washington, which encouraged the
violent
overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February, has a special
responsibility to
see through a far-reaching rebuilding effort," concluding:
"No amount of aid can solve Haiti's problems unless the appointed interim
government of technocrats... does its part competently and fairly, seeing to
it that
the impoverished slum dwellers who followed Mr. Aristide are not again
ignored.
Until the latest rebuilding effort demonstrates a will to take on these
challenges,
Haiti's poor are entitled to remain skeptical."6
The Miami Herald, in an editorial written just prior to the meeting entitled
"New
Government Should Seek Even-Handed Justice," threw its support behind aid to
the
interim government but cautioned that the poor record thus far of that
government in the
administration of justice gives rise to concern. "Instead of
reconciliation," wrote the
Herald, citing the widespread arrest and intimidation of the former,
Aristide- led
government's supporters, "the new government seems intent on revenge."7
To the surprise of many, even the US Assistant Secretary of State for
Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega, well-known for his staunchly
anti-Aristide posture
and supportive stance toward the interim government, voiced concern last
week in this
same vein. In an interview with the Miami Herald, Noriega specified that the
recent
arrests by the interim government of such officials as former Haitian Prime
Minister
Yvon Neptune "trouble the Bush administration."8
In view of these concerns, one might conclude that while the international
donors
have indeed 'shown the money' to the interim government, that largess comes
attached
with closer scrutiny and some strings, including the demand for even-handed
administration of justice and respect for human rights. Whether or not these
international
concerns will be fully and effectively addressed by the interim government
or will be
consistently raised and monitored by international actors, however, remain
open
questions that should be followed carefully.

THE BAD
This leads to some consideration of the previously mentioned 'bad'
development of
the past week, the issuance of yet another human rights report highly
critical of the
situation in Haiti. In its detailed July 19 report, the Institute for
Justice and Democracy in
Haiti deepens the concerns expressed a month earlier by Amnesty
International that Haiti
is not-so-successfully struggling under a heavy burden of human rights
abuse, violence
and impunity. That burden includes not only the so-called 'witch- hunt'
enacted by the
interim government against supporters and members of the ousted government,
but also
the fact that neither the leaders nor members of the myriad of armed groups
- includ ing
high profile insurrectionist groups that remain armed and in charge in
localities
throughout the countryside - have been disarmed or detained. To date,
little, if anything,
has been done by Haiti's interim government - or by UN troops, for that
matter - about
this dangerous situation of Haiti's new warlords.
Perhaps the interim government, however, whose leader previously embraced
the
armed insurrectionists as 'freedom fighters,' has begun to read the writing
on the
international wall in regards to this issue. Even though interim Prime
Minister Latortue
has not retracted his embrace of the thugs, his government did issue a
document on July
8th that sets a September 15th deadline for armed factions to turn in
illegal weapons and
disarm themselves before facing arrest. That official edict, however, lacks
details of
how this will be achieved.
One so-called rebel leader issued an immediate response to the interim
government's
disarmament manifesto from his 'headquarters' in the Central Plateau. Former
FAd'H
Col. Remissainthe Ravix, who claims leadership over some 1,800 re-armed
soldiers,
stated: "If they think they can confiscate our weapons, they can try it, but
they better
watch out. If our weapons are illegal," he continued, "the government is
also illegal
because it is thanks to our weapons they are now where they are."9
Ravix's response is only one indication that Haiti's 'genie of armed
political
violence' will be very difficult to put back in the bottle. Some analysts
have dismissed
Haiti's resurgent soldiers as aging, fat, and unhappy activists who, given a
deferred
retirement pension, will melt back into the crowd. The fact remains,
however, that even
those who fit this description - and not all do - are armed, dangerous, and
abusive.
Further, while disarmament may be a stated objective of the UN mission to
Haiti, the
military leaders of that mission contend that the ir position will be to
support a
strengthened and reformed Haitian National Police (HNP), which will do the
disarming.
This approach by UN peacekeepers is worrisome in view of the alarmingly weak
and
ineffective status of the HNP, plus the fact that the interim government,
through its
Minister of the Interior, former General Herard Abraham, is pushing hard to
integrate
former soldiers into the reformulated force.
While these developments are disturbing, it is what is going on beneath this
radar
screen of the apparent reinstallation of the ancien regime militaire that is
even more
troublesome. Reports of the re-creation of the dreaded SIN (National
Intelligence
Service) in the Ministry of the Interior, headed by a former officer of
Duvalier's
repressive "Leopard" unit of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H) have been
joined by
reports of the creation of other so-called 'national security commissions'
within that
ministry staffed with notorious former FAd'H officers. Among the
disreputable former
military officers emerging with ministerial sinecures is former Gen.
Williams Regala, a
key figure in several provisional military governments in the late 1980's.
Not only do these developments portend badly for improved human rights and
public
safety in Haiti, but they also throw into doubt the ability of the country
to move toward
free, fair, participative and open elections next year. Following the ouster
of President
Aristide and the nationwide flight of elected officials affiliated with his
political party,
the resultant political vacuum was filled in many communities in a de facto
sense by
individuals aligned with the former Haitian army or paramilitary groups.
Ample
evidence is also emerging that the interim government, through its Interior
Ministry, is in
the process of appointing to various local and municipal level posts some
individuals
with rather questionable democratic credentials.
As elections approach, these individuals could form the backdrop of support
for 'law
and order' political candidates affiliated with military and paramilitary
groups. These de
facto local officials could adopt a strategy of using their weigh to stack
the electoral deck
in favor of such wannabe political figures as well-known insurrectionist
leader and
alleged drug dealer/coup plotter-turned-politician Guy Philippe or other
candidates with
a military background, to ensure less-than-democratic election results. The
reemergence
of militarism throughout the country will make it difficult for any
political
party or organization - not just the embattled FL - to campaign unless it
receives a
laissez passé from the local 'authorities.'

The Ugly
Now, let's turn our attention to the third and 'ugly' aforementioned
development, the
on- line publication on regime change in Haiti. To begin assessing the
importance of
this development, it is useful to delve briefly into the status of what
former US
Ambassador to Haiti Brian Dean Curran described a year ago as the "chimeres
of
Washington," or individuals and organizations who worked in cahoots with
partisan
political groups and others in Haiti toward instability and to undermine
prospects for
political settlements there.10
Much was made during hearings in the US House of Representatives and Senate
in
early March 2004, immediately following the ouster of Aristide, of the
importance for
Washington to move forward on Haiti by forging a bi-partisan approach. This
followed
an acknowledged period when the political polarity plaguing Port-au-Prince
had become
replicated in Washington.
To some refreshing extent, bi-partisanship toward Haiti has occurred in
Washington,
with support of renewed aid by representatives of both political parties,
witnessed by
strong endorsement of the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunities (HERO) act
by key
members from both sides of the political aisle in the US Senate. If it
becomes law,
HERO will provide goods assembled in Haiti with preferential access to US
markets,
hence creating needed employment. The bi-partisanship also has been
manifested
through a general willingness on both sides of the aisle to give the
installed interim
government a chance to prove itself, in spite of the lingering bad taste
among many
Democrats over how that interim government came to power in the first place.
Regarding the executive branch, the Bush Administration, having achieved a
political
goal with the removal of Aristide, now has altered a long-held policy that
at best
distanced itself from the government of Haiti and at worst actively
supported initiatives
and strategies that undermined that government. Its new approach is to jump
on board,
and actively promote, the 'engage Haiti' train. Ironically, in doing so, it
has confirmed
its own prior policy of estrangement from the GOH by having Mr. Noriega
pronounce in
the immediate aftermath of Aristide's departure that "we will engage the
Government of
Haiti..."11
A key question, however, is how that engagement will ultimately define
itself. It is
here that the third development over the past week - the aforementioned
investigative
report into the political activities of the International Republican
Institute (IRI) - begs
attention. This article presents a highly disturbing story of long-term
strategies and
activities enacted under the auspices of the IRI that contributed
fundamentally to political
conflict, violence, and regime change in Haiti, highlighting the antics of
its Haitian-born
program representative who is characterized in the piece as "the Haitian
version of
Ahmed Chalabi." Among the revelations confirmed in it is that there has been
a history
of direct contact between that program representative and Guy Philippe, the
notorious
armed insurrectionist and alleged drug trafficker and coup instigator
mentioned above.
But, one might conclude, that was then and this is now, particularly in view
of today's
desired bi-partisan approach toward Haiti that will relegate the so-called
"chimeres of
Washington" to the dustbin of the past. From now on, this thinking goes, the
winks and
nods that emanated from Washington over the past four years will be eclipsed
by a single,
overt policy.
But is that so? Although it is too soon to reach any definitive conclusion,
information
from Haiti suggest that at least some of Washington's chimeres remain quite
active as
independent actors who will undermine the stated desire for bi-partisanship
toward Haiti.
For example, just as the interim government is coming under increased
pressure
regarding its apparent lop-sided approach toward rule of law, administration
of justice,
and political participation in Haiti, information from Port-au-Prince
indicates growing
concern among international organization representatives over the inability
of the IRI to
play team ball in the promotion of an inclusive and transparent political
future for Haiti.
As program officers, experts and consultants from the United Nations, the
Organization
of American States, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and other
international
organizations, including the Washington-based National Democratic Institute
for
International Affairs (NDI) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
have
begun to work together - and with Haitian officials - to set the stage for
Haiti's political
future through democratic elections, some have expressed concern that the
IRI has not
been actively involved among them. Is this controversial international
political actor
developing an independent parallel strategy seeking to promote only the
interests of its
own political favorites? If so, then why?

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
One takes a risk in here in Boston this week, and throughout this highly
polarized
American electoral season, to call for a bi-partisan approach toward
anything. But
clearly, bi-partisanship out of Washington, toward Haiti, can only be
positive in helping
our neighbor and its people to move forward and begin to resolve their not
inconsiderable
political, economic, environmental and social problems. And, such an
approach can
avoid any further tendency by Washington toward Secretary of State Powell's
now well known "Pottery Barn" principle: you break it and you own it.
Progress toward the
resolution of Haiti's deep and complex problems merits US support, not US
ownership.
Through a sustained, consistent, fair, and openly engaged approach, the US
has an
opportunity to break away from covert, contradictory, one-sided or
misleading policies
that do more harm than good, and to help Haiti move forward.
Unfortunately, past US commitment toward Haiti and its people, like that of
the
international community, has trended less toward a sustained and consistent
approach
than toward one that looks for the next band-aid to apply to a continuing
series of crises.
As stated in the New York Times, US involvement has to become more than
acting "only
when crises threaten to unleash waves of unwanted refugees," when we are
"typically
content... with writing checks and changing a few faces at the top."12
Today in Washington, Haiti has fallen off the high-profile policy radar
screen. In
spite of such warning flags as those outlined above that indicate a simple
regime change
has not made all well in Haiti, the general perception in Washington is that
things have
settled down quite a bit. All that's needed, therefore, is a commitment to
write checks
now that a few faces at the top have been changed.
This brief examination of good, bad and ugly developments of the past week
suggests that this is not a time to pay less attention to Haiti and, in so
doing, to allow the
resurgence of actors and the continuation of strategies that aim to
undermine democratic
development in Haiti and to promote political vengeance and polarization.
Rather, this is
a crucial time to keep Haiti front and center and to underscore the
necessity of policies
and programs that do more than write a check and facilitate some - in or
beyond Haiti -
to try to be the bull in the china shop.
Haiti, indeed, has yet another chance to move forward. The country, and that
chance, deserve s our support. That support, however, must include informed
and critical
assessments of continuing developments in Haiti, as well as close, regular
and sustained
Congressional oversight of policies and programs supported by the U.S.
government and
receiving U.S. government funding. As implied in the donor meeting- linked
editorials
cited above, while aid to our impoverished neighbor merits our support, we
must ensure
that the playing field on which that aid will be spent is a level one that
includes respect
for human rights and the inclusion of all the society's social, economic and
political
actors in the resolution of problems.
Many analysts of Haiti, including this one, have voiced concern about the
country's winner-takes-all political tendencies. In a democratic political
culture, there is
room for both the winners and the losers, as there is also a compelling
necessity for all
actors to contribute toward the well-being of their country. 'Good, bad and
ugly' may be
suitable for a Hollywood movie plot, but such a combustible mix is not
healthy toward
the resolution of a country's deeply rooted social, economic and political
problems.

This essay will appear in a forthcoming issue of The Trotter Review
published by the
Trotter Institute at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.



1 "Donors pledge $1bn in Haiti aid," BBC News, July 21, 2004; "$1 Billion is
Pledged to Help Haiti
Rebuild, Topping Request," Christopher Marquis, New York Times, July 21,
2004
2 "Human Rights Violations in Haiti: February - May 2004," Institute for
Justice and Democracy in Haiti,
July 19, 2004, 19 pp. "Haiti" Breaking the cycle of violence: A last chance
for Haiti?," Amnesty
International, June 21, 2004, 39 pp.
3 "The other regime change: Did the Bush administration allow a network of
right-wing Republicans to
foment a violent coup in Haiti?" Max Blumenthal, salon.con, July 16, 2004
4 For an assessment of evolving US-Haiti policy over the past ten years,
see, "US Policy Toward Haiti:
Engagement or Estrangement?," Robert Maguire, Haiti Papers Number 8, Trinity
College Haiti Program,
November 2003, 12 pp. (The paper is available on-line at:
http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/Haiti_Progr
am.htm)
5 "Donors Asked to Pledge $924 Million to Haiti Next Week," Traci Hukill,
U.N., Wire, July 13, 2004.
Details of the government's proposed plan and the Interim Cooperation
Framework are available on-line at
http://www.worldbank.org/haitidonors2004
6 "The Long Haul in Haiti," New York Times, July 23, 2004.
7 "New Government Should Seek Even-Handed Justice," Miami Herald, July 18,
2004
8 "Latortue gets U.S. warning on holding Aristide allies: A top U/S/
diplomat expresses concern over
arrests in Haiti, but says there had been improvement otherwise since
President Aristide left," Michael
Ottey, Miami Herald, July 17, 2004
9 "Haiti ex-rebels threaten to take up arms again," Joseph Guyler Delva,
Reuters, July 14, 2004.
10 See, "US Policy Toward Haiti," op cit., p.6
11 "Haiti at the Crossroads of Democracy," remarks of Roger F. Noriega,
Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemis phere Affairs to the American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC, April 14, 2004.
12 "The Long Haul in Haiti," op cit.



Steve Brown
brownst@soc.mil