25466: Wharram - news - Without greater UN help, Haiti will soon collapse (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

> From Bruce Wharram <bruce.wharram@sev.org>



Without greater UN help, Haiti will soon collapse
Mark L. Schneider The Boston Globe

FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 2005
WASHINGTON It's two minutes to midnight in Haiti. When the clock strikes,
the country will implode and become a permanent failed state, right on
America's doorstep. About the only thing that can stop the clock, let alone
start winding it back some, is if the Bush administration commits marines,
money and diplomatic muscle to help the United Nations mission there.

That may sound alarmist, but it is time to ring the alarm: The daily
deterioration of security has now reached panic proportions. Dozens of
kidnappings, turf gang battles and drug-financed or politically motivated
killings, some involving the Haitian National Police, spell out the deadly
menace in Haiti day after day. The country is on the edge of a complete
collapse.

On June 1, the UN Security Council failed to do more than extend the mandate
for 24 days. On Wednesday, the UN Security Council took up the issue of
Haiti again, and while it extended the peacekeeping mandate until next
February and took some action to strengthen that mandate, it has to address
the crisis more fundamentally.

The critical security issues the United Nations must tackle are threefold:

First, it must be able to control and reform fully the Haitian National
Police. Haiti still has fewer than 5,000 police, too many of whom have
questionable backgrounds and suspicious links to drugs, kidnappings and
extrajudicial executions. A far larger UN international civilian police
component is needed to exercise sufficient executive control over the
Haitian police to suspend the killers, establish effective internal
accountability and reform a Haitian police force expanded to probably double
its size today.

To start, the UN civilian police force needs to triple its own current
strength of 1,200 troops, adding as many French-speaking police as possible.
French-speaking international judges are also required for high visibility
cases. France, Canada and other Francophone countries have to step up. The
extra 275 civilian police just voted are simply not enough.

Second, the current Brazilian-led UN mission has to have a stronger military
contingent so that its troops are more visible and so it can maintain a
rapid reaction capability as well as collect better intelligence. As
politically unpalatable as it may seem, Washington needs to put U.S. boots
on the ground - or at least on a ship offshore with the mobility to move
them around the country to demonstrate that there will be security for
electoral registration, campaigning and voting during parliamentary and
presidential elections, now scheduled for October through December.

Third, the UN mission needs to disarm and demobilize the illegal armed
groups, including the urban gangs responsible for much of the violence in
the capital, many identified with hard-line factions of former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party. The former Haitian military and their
allies, largely outside Port-au-Prince, were part of an insurgency against
Aristide and were even called "thugs" by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell at one point: They too need to be disarmed and demobilized. And
unlike in some previous programs, they should not get promised benefits
until they actually give up their weapons and are screened for serious
crimes. A timetable needs to be established and implemented - region by
region, parish by parish.

It has been a year since the UN mission took over from the multinational
coalition, and while the talented Juan Gabriel Valdés, former foreign
minister of Chile, heads the UN effort, the overall endeavor has been
weakened by inadequate resources and, until recently, an overly cautious
military strategy.

The U.S./French-led multinational force that initially prepared the
transition failed to get rid of the "spoilers" - the drug dealers, former
army gunmen, armed urban gangs and violence-prone extremists from the pro-
and anti-Aristide camps - who simply waited them out. As a Haitian
businessman told me recently, "Our people are fleeing the country out of
fear."

Until the spoilers are removed from the field, the transition is doomed.
Without security, credible elections cannot be held, donor-financed
quick-impact projects for job creation are restricted, and private economic
investment cannot get off the ground. And without security, the goal of a
democratically elected, viable government capable of taking initial steps to
lift Haiti out of the depths of poverty, corruption, violence and despair is
stillborn.

(Mark L. Schneider is the senior vice president of the International Crisis
Group in Washington.)

WASHINGTON It's two minutes to midnight in Haiti. When the clock strikes,
the country will implode and become a permanent failed state, right on
America's doorstep. About the only thing that can stop the clock, let alone
start winding it back some, is if the Bush administration commits marines,
money and diplomatic muscle to help the United Nations mission there.

That may sound alarmist, but it is time to ring the alarm: The daily
deterioration of security has now reached panic proportions. Dozens of
kidnappings, turf gang battles and drug-financed or politically motivated
killings, some involving the Haitian National Police, spell out the deadly
menace in Haiti day after day. The country is on the edge of a complete
collapse.

On June 1, the UN Security Council failed to do more than extend the mandate
for 24 days. On Wednesday, the UN Security Council took up the issue of
Haiti again, and while it extended the peacekeeping mandate until next
February and took some action to strengthen that mandate, it has to address
the crisis more fundamentally.

The critical security issues the United Nations must tackle are threefold:

First, it must be able to control and reform fully the Haitian National
Police. Haiti still has fewer than 5,000 police, too many of whom have
questionable backgrounds and suspicious links to drugs, kidnappings and
extrajudicial executions. A far larger UN international civilian police
component is needed to exercise sufficient executive control over the
Haitian police to suspend the killers, establish effective internal
accountability and reform a Haitian police force expanded to probably double
its size today.

To start, the UN civilian police force needs to triple its own current
strength of 1,200 troops, adding as many French-speaking police as possible.
French-speaking international judges are also required for high visibility
cases. France, Canada and other Francophone countries have to step up. The
extra 275 civilian police just voted are simply not enough.

Second, the current Brazilian-led UN mission has to have a stronger military
contingent so that its troops are more visible and so it can maintain a
rapid reaction capability as well as collect better intelligence. As
politically unpalatable as it may seem, Washington needs to put U.S. boots
on the ground - or at least on a ship offshore with the mobility to move
them around the country to demonstrate that there will be security for
electoral registration, campaigning and voting during parliamentary and
presidential elections, now scheduled for October through December.

Third, the UN mission needs to disarm and demobilize the illegal armed
groups, including the urban gangs responsible for much of the violence in
the capital, many identified with hard-line factions of former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party. The former Haitian military and their
allies, largely outside Port-au-Prince, were part of an insurgency against
Aristide and were even called "thugs" by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell at one point: They too need to be disarmed and demobilized. And
unlike in some previous programs, they should not get promised benefits
until they actually give up their weapons and are screened for serious
crimes. A timetable needs to be established and implemented - region by
region, parish by parish.

It has been a year since the UN mission took over from the multinational
coalition, and while the talented Juan Gabriel Valdés, former foreign
minister of Chile, heads the UN effort, the overall endeavor has been
weakened by inadequate resources and, until recently, an overly cautious
military strategy.

The U.S./French-led multinational force that initially prepared the
transition failed to get rid of the "spoilers" - the drug dealers, former
army gunmen, armed urban gangs and violence-prone extremists from the pro-
and anti-Aristide camps - who simply waited them out. As a Haitian
businessman told me recently, "Our people are fleeing the country out of
fear."

Until the spoilers are removed from the field, the transition is doomed.
Without security, credible elections cannot be held, donor-financed
quick-impact projects for job creation are restricted, and private economic
investment cannot get off the ground. And without security, the goal of a
democratically elected, viable government capable of taking initial steps to
lift Haiti out of the depths of poverty, corruption, violence and despair is
stillborn.

(Mark L. Schneider is the senior vice president of the International Crisis
Group in Washington.)

WASHINGTON It's two minutes to midnight in Haiti. When the clock strikes,
the country will implode and become a permanent failed state, right on
America's doorstep. About the only thing that can stop the clock, let alone
start winding it back some, is if the Bush administration commits marines,
money and diplomatic muscle to help the United Nations mission there.

That may sound alarmist, but it is time to ring the alarm: The daily
deterioration of security has now reached panic proportions. Dozens of
kidnappings, turf gang battles and drug-financed or politically motivated
killings, some involving the Haitian National Police, spell out the deadly
menace in Haiti day after day. The country is on the edge of a complete
collapse.

On June 1, the UN Security Council failed to do more than extend the mandate
for 24 days. On Wednesday, the UN Security Council took up the issue of
Haiti again, and while it extended the peacekeeping mandate until next
February and took some action to strengthen that mandate, it has to address
the crisis more fundamentally.

The critical security issues the United Nations must tackle are threefold:

First, it must be able to control and reform fully the Haitian National
Police. Haiti still has fewer than 5,000 police, too many of whom have
questionable backgrounds and suspicious links to drugs, kidnappings and
extrajudicial executions. A far larger UN international civilian police
component is needed to exercise sufficient executive control over the
Haitian police to suspend the killers, establish effective internal
accountability and reform a Haitian police force expanded to probably double
its size today.

To start, the UN civilian police force needs to triple its own current
strength of 1,200 troops, adding as many French-speaking police as possible.
French-speaking international judges are also required for high visibility
cases. France, Canada and other Francophone countries have to step up. The
extra 275 civilian police just voted are simply not enough.

Second, the current Brazilian-led UN mission has to have a stronger military
contingent so that its troops are more visible and so it can maintain a
rapid reaction capability as well as collect better intelligence. As
politically unpalatable as it may seem, Washington needs to put U.S. boots
on the ground - or at least on a ship offshore with the mobility to move
them around the country to demonstrate that there will be security for
electoral registration, campaigning and voting during parliamentary and
presidential elections, now scheduled for October through December.

Third, the UN mission needs to disarm and demobilize the illegal armed
groups, including the urban gangs responsible for much of the violence in
the capital, many identified with hard-line factions of former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party. The former Haitian military and their
allies, largely outside Port-au-Prince, were part of an insurgency against
Aristide and were even called "thugs" by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell at one point: They too need to be disarmed and demobilized. And
unlike in some previous programs, they should not get promised benefits
until they actually give up their weapons and are screened for serious
crimes. A timetable needs to be established and implemented - region by
region, parish by parish.

It has been a year since the UN mission took over from the multinational
coalition, and while the talented Juan Gabriel Valdés, former foreign
minister of Chile, heads the UN effort, the overall endeavor has been
weakened by inadequate resources and, until recently, an overly cautious
military strategy.

The U.S./French-led multinational force that initially prepared the
transition failed to get rid of the "spoilers" - the drug dealers, former
army gunmen, armed urban gangs and violence-prone extremists from the pro-
and anti-Aristide camps - who simply waited them out. As a Haitian
businessman told me recently, "Our people are fleeing the country out of
fear."

Until the spoilers are removed from the field, the transition is doomed.
Without security, credible elections cannot be held, donor-financed
quick-impact projects for job creation are restricted, and private economic
investment cannot get off the ground. And without security, the goal of a
democratically elected, viable government capable of taking initial steps to
lift Haiti out of the depths of poverty, corruption, violence and despair is
stillborn.

(Mark L. Schneider is the senior vice president of the International Crisis
Group in Washington.)

WASHINGTON It's two minutes to midnight in Haiti. When the clock strikes,
the country will implode and become a permanent failed state, right on
America's doorstep. About the only thing that can stop the clock, let alone
start winding it back some, is if the Bush administration commits marines,
money and diplomatic muscle to help the United Nations mission there.

That may sound alarmist, but it is time to ring the alarm: The daily
deterioration of security has now reached panic proportions. Dozens of
kidnappings, turf gang battles and drug-financed or politically motivated
killings, some involving the Haitian National Police, spell out the deadly
menace in Haiti day after day. The country is on the edge of a complete
collapse.

On June 1, the UN Security Council failed to do more than extend the mandate
for 24 days. On Wednesday, the UN Security Council took up the issue of
Haiti again, and while it extended the peacekeeping mandate until next
February and took some action to strengthen that mandate, it has to address
the crisis more fundamentally.

The critical security issues the United Nations must tackle are threefold:

First, it must be able to control and reform fully the Haitian National
Police. Haiti still has fewer than 5,000 police, too many of whom have
questionable backgrounds and suspicious links to drugs, kidnappings and
extrajudicial executions. A far larger UN international civilian police
component is needed to exercise sufficient executive control over the
Haitian police to suspend the killers, establish effective internal
accountability and reform a Haitian police force expanded to probably double
its size today.

To start, the UN civilian police force needs to triple its own current
strength of 1,200 troops, adding as many French-speaking police as possible.
French-speaking international judges are also required for high visibility
cases. France, Canada and other Francophone countries have to step up. The
extra 275 civilian police just voted are simply not enough.

Second, the current Brazilian-led UN mission has to have a stronger military
contingent so that its troops are more visible and so it can maintain a
rapid reaction capability as well as collect better intelligence. As
politically unpalatable as it may seem, Washington needs to put U.S. boots
on the ground - or at least on a ship offshore with the mobility to move
them around the country to demonstrate that there will be security for
electoral registration, campaigning and voting during parliamentary and
presidential elections, now scheduled for October through December.

Third, the UN mission needs to disarm and demobilize the illegal armed
groups, including the urban gangs responsible for much of the violence in
the capital, many identified with hard-line factions of former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party. The former Haitian military and their
allies, largely outside Port-au-Prince, were part of an insurgency against
Aristide and were even called "thugs" by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell at one point: They too need to be disarmed and demobilized. And
unlike in some previous programs, they should not get promised benefits
until they actually give up their weapons and are screened for serious
crimes. A timetable needs to be established and implemented - region by
region, parish by parish.

It has been a year since the UN mission took over from the multinational
coalition, and while the talented Juan Gabriel Valdés, former foreign
minister of Chile, heads the UN effort, the overall endeavor has been
weakened by inadequate resources and, until recently, an overly cautious
military strategy.

The U.S./French-led multinational force that initially prepared the
transition failed to get rid of the "spoilers" - the drug dealers, former
army gunmen, armed urban gangs and violence-prone extremists from the pro-
and anti-Aristide camps - who simply waited them out. As a Haitian
businessman told me recently, "Our people are fleeing the country out of
fear."

Until the spoilers are removed from the field, the transition is doomed.
Without security, credible elections cannot be held, donor-financed
quick-impact projects for job creation are restricted, and private economic
investment cannot get off the ground. And without security, the goal of a
democratically elected, viable government capable of taking initial steps to
lift Haiti out of the depths of poverty, corruption, violence and despair is
stillborn.

(Mark L. Schneider is the senior vice president of the International Crisis
Group in Washington.)

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