26681: Wharram (commentary) Haiti's Elections: The Case for a Short Delay (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: Bruce Wharram <bruce.wharram@sev.org>

©2005 Crisis Group - International Crisis Group


Haiti?s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay

Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°9
25 November 2005

OVERVIEW

The transitional Haitian government?s postponement of presidential and
parliamentary elections to 27 December leaves it still unlikely that a new
and legitimate government can be installed by the constitutionally mandated
target of 7 February 2006. Rather than rush the elections over the Christmas
holidays ? risking low turnout, insufficient international observation, and
not enough time to fix serious organisational and security problems ? the
government and the international community should ensure a credible
procedure by delaying the process one month, with the transfer of power
taking place in March 2006.

Nearly 75 per cent of the eligible voters have been brought on to voter
rolls, presidential and parliamentary campaigns are in motion, and a strong
manager finally has been appointed to orchestrate the election.
Unfortunately, a convergence of other factors has offset those gains. Few of
those registered voters have received their voter ID cards, and violence and
insecurity are daily concerns in many areas. In addition, last minute
qualifying of presidential and parliamentary candidates has added to public
confusion, civic education has been minimal and almost no one has been hired
yet to count ballots. Those failures have led to two postponements already.

Delays and uncertainties have hindered campaigning. A final decision on
qualified presidential candidates was made only on 11 November. Two
contenders were disallowed because of dual citizenship, while the delays
(some intentional) largely resulted from power struggles among elements of
the transitional government, opposition by criminal and political gangs, and
bureaucratic snags. The international community has been too slow in finding
the right mix of carrots and sticks to force not merely timely but, far more
importantly, credible elections.

Once the first, essential step of a month?s postponement is taken, action is
needed on three fronts for successful elections:

    *
      Electoral restructuring. Immediate, meaningful pressure is required
from the international community, primarily the UN, the U.S., France, Canada
and the Latin American governments forming the UN Mission for the
Stabilisation of Haiti (MINUSTAH), to end the internal Haitian disputes and
delaying tactics. Not only presidential but also parliamentary and local
candidates have to be finally confirmed, voting centres set up, ballots
printed, voting officials hired and trained, and international observers
enlisted for the entire process from campaign through the inevitable appeal
of the results.

    If the process falters again, options begin with a new Security Council
resolution mandating a virtual international takeover of the election
process. This should authorise ? in the event that electoral misconduct
involves corrupt practices, criminal links or support for violence ?
targeted sanctions against those responsible, including review of their
travel visas, assets and financial holdings in all countries. Given the many
influential Haitians with dual citizenship in the U.S., France and Canada,
the threat of that action might well encourage the kind of cooperation that
has been lacking in the transition to date.

    *
      Security. MINUSTAH needs to begin implementing the existing Security
Council mandate for disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups, starting
in carefully selected towns in the countryside and in urban neighbourhoods.
At the same time, the UN Police (UNPOL) should exercise their vetting
authority under that mandate and direct the Haitian National Police (HNP) to
suspend and detain all officers identified by UNPOL as responsible for
criminal violence. If the transitional government continues to block that
action, the Security Council will need to respond by giving MINUSTAH full
control of the police.

    To strike a direct blow at the spoilers involved in smuggling and
customs evasion, at least one port should be placed in international hands.
That also might cut suspected financing of some political candidates by
criminal networks. To demonstrate that MINUSTAH has the muscle for these
actions, the U.S. should announce it has designated an ?over the horizon?
force of ship-based Marines to assist if necessary.

    *
      Political accords. If the elections are to be seen as opening a new
chapter of political opportunity, efforts should be renewed to pursue a
national governance pact. Reconciliation has been sorely missing from the
transition process. Building on the election code of conduct the parties
already have signed with MINUSTAH?s support, a focus on the post-election
government could send a message that the old political stalemate has been
broken. One option would be to pursue agreement among the key surviving
candidates after the first round of voting on a few priorities, such as
public education, a physical infrastructure element like roads and tackling
corruption.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 25 November 2005