29177: Sprague (Interview) Lindsay and Elie (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From J Sprague    <jebsprague@[nospam]mac.com>



http://news.nacla.org/2006/08/30/what-future-for-haiti-an-interview- 
with-patrick-elie

What Future for Haiti? An Interview with Patrick Elie
30 Aug 2006by Reed Lindsay for NACLA

In February 2004, U.S. Marines whisked away then-President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide from Haiti amid an armed rebellion led by disgruntled former soldiers 
and paramilitary actors. Despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping 
force, violence and poverty increased under the U.S.-backed interim government 
led by Interim Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, which courted the elite and its 
international backers while alienating Haiti’s overwhelming poor majority. The 
crisis hit a low point last December and January, with daily shootings in the 
poor neighborhood of Cité Soleil and an outbreak of kidnappings.

President René Préval’s electoral victory on February 7 suddenly brought peace 
and hope to Haiti for the first time in two years. Haiti’s poor flooded the 
polls to vote, and one week later they blockaded nearly every major road in the 
country to demand that the electoral council name Préval the victor in the 
first round. Préval has formed a coalition government and has courted all sides 
of the political spectrum, including both pro-Aristide militants from Cité 
Soleil as well as light-skinned elites. He has taken a similar approach in his 
foreign policy, seeking help from the United States and France but also Cuba 
and Venezuela. It is uncertain how long he will be able to juggle these 
different interests, and more than six months into his presidency, Préval 
continues to remain largely an enigma.

Patrick Elie has been an activist in Haiti since 1986, when the nation’s 
popular movements drove former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier from the country. 
In the late 1980s, he participated in these movements alongside René Préval, 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Antoine Izmery, among other pro-democracy activists 
struggling against the military governments that assumed power after Duvalier’s 
ouster. Elie was head of Aristide’s security detail during his first 
presidential campaign in 1990. When the former priest became the country’s 
first democratically elected leader, Elie assumed the position of anti- 
narcotics chief. He went into exile after the military coup and returned to 
become secretary of state for defense when Aristide was restored to power in 
1994. Since 1995, he has not served in government but has remained politically 
active, and is a founding member of SOS (Citizens’ Watchdog Center), a group 
that seeks to promote the creation of a national network of grassroots 
organizations.

Interview with Patrick Elie and introduction by Reed Lindsay.

Reed Lindsay: How accurate is the characterization of Haiti as a country with a 
history or a culture of violence?

Patrick Elie: It is an image of Haiti that is grossly distorted. The so-called 
level of violence in Haiti pales in comparison with violence in at least half 
the countries in the world. Compare the history of Haiti with that of England, 
France and the U.S. and Germany. Don’t go back to the 1200s. Look back to 1804 
and you have more violence in those countries than in Haiti. So the 
characterization of Haiti as a violent country is a bunch of hogwash. Why is 
there tension and instability in Haiti? It is simply because in Haiti you have 
5 percent of the population controlling 60 percent of the national wealth, 
while 80 percent live in poverty. If you had such a situation in any other 
country you’d have a massacre or a civil war but that hasn’t happened in Haiti, 
which speaks to the self-restraint of the Haitian population. The instability 
of the last 20 to 25 years has been caused essentially by this elite as well as 
their foreign allies who cannot truly accept the principal of one citizen-one 
vote because it would mean that they would lose their privileges and influence. 
They have tried to quench the will of the poor majority of Haiti and tried to 
change the rules of the game because they’ve lost in elections. If it were up 
to the Haitian people (and when I say Haitian people I’m talking about the vast 
majority of Haitians who are poor) there would be both democracy and stability. 
If you look at recent history, the Haitian people have chosen to vote rather 
than to riot. They voted four times in a row for the same political family, the 
same political leaning, the same agenda. They consistently have picked both 
democracy and stability.

RL: How does the United States government’s role in Haiti compare to its role 
in other countries in Latin America?

PE: The role of the U.S. in Haiti is no different than what it is in other 
countries in Latin America in that the U.S. is interested in dominating Haiti 
and dictating its policy. That’s the reason why they cannot stand the idea of 
somebody being elected with a large majority because that means the government 
will not be easy to manipulate as one that has very little popular legitimacy 
and from the get-go this was the United States’ problem with Aristide and 
Lavalas. The role of the U.S. in all of Haitian history has been egregious. The 
U.S. occupied the country for 20 years from 1915 to 1934 and left us with a 
repressive army. But this pattern was not particular to Haiti. Go to the DR, 
and they did the same thing with Trujillo, and the same thing in Nicaragua with 
Somoza. When the U.S. said it would support democracies rather than military 
dictatorships, the Haitians did not play along because they did not want the 
type of democracy that the U.S. wanted to impose. The Haitians, that is, the 80 
percent of Haitians who have been excluded for two centuries, wanted a true 
democracy, where they would define the agenda and get to pick who they wanted 
rather than be forced to choose between candidates they don’t like. Why has the 
U.S. occupied the country three times? There are many reasons. There are 
economic reasons, but even if you don’t concede to that, Haiti has been a 
powerful symbol for having overthrown slavery and becoming independent and for 
what it’s doing now, which is proving that the poorest people in the 
hemisphere, mostly illiterate, can know more about democracy than the people 
who are pretending to be beacons of civilization. And they can stand up to the 
will of the U.S. The movement that you see now in Latin America, the new large 
social movements that are sweeping away the traditional political parties, that 
also started in a way in Haiti. For the U.S., Haiti is an example that must be 
crushed, that must be made to fail. That’s the principal interest of the U.S. 
in Haiti.

RL: But the U.S. hasn’t been the only first world country to play a major role 
in Haiti in recent years. What about France and Canada?

PE: France’s role in Haiti is a direct result of the demand for reparation that 
President Aristide put forward. Also, I think France could never get over the 
defeat of 1804. In all of Haitian history, never has a French president set 
foot in Haiti. And Santo Domingue is probably the French colony that played the 
greatest role in French history. It was the richest colony by far, and caused 
them to lose Louisiana.
With Canada, I can point to a number of reasons why they have switched 
directions in Haitian policy. One is that Canada is aligning its policy with 
that of the U.S. more and more after Iraq where they refused to participate 
because the Chretien government would have been defeated if Canada had gone 
into Iraq. Haiti was an easy way to please the U.S. Haiti’s a country with no 
army and no possibility to resist regime change.

RL: How would you characterize the role of Brazil, Argentina and Chile in the 
UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti?

PE: The Latin American countries had their own reasons and interests. Brazil 
wants to be recognized as an emerging power and wanted a seat in the UN 
Security Council. For countries like Argentina and Chile, they wanted to show 
that they are countries that count. Despite the fact that I’m against the 
occupation, if I had to choose to be occupied by U.S. Marines, the French 
Legionnaires or the Latin American countries and the UN, I’d pick the latter, 
but the positive thing that could emerge from this crisis is that Latin America 
will discover Haiti and remember that Haiti is at the origin of their own 
independence. Also, I believe that Haiti will have the possibility of 
reorienting its diplomacy toward the Caribbean and Latin America rather than be 
prisoner of its destructive relationship with the United States.

RL: What about the allegations that UN troops tolerated and sometimes committed 
abuses in the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince?

PE: I think there were some people within the UN that were truly sympathetic to 
the Haitian people. We cannot forget the excesses of the UN, especially in the 
popular neighborhoods like Cite Soleil. But we also must recognize that the UN 
troops did not go all out in military operations in poor neighborhoods as they 
were being encouraged to do by the Haitian elite and the governments of the 
U.S., France and Canada. As President Préval has said, I would like to see the 
UN mission continue. But we don’t need all those men with guns. We’d rather see 
doctors and technicians helping us.

RL: Can you evaluate the last two years of rule by the interim government of 
Primer Minister Gérard Latortue?

PE: I prefer to call it a de facto regime or puppet regime because that’s truly 
what it was. It was forced upon the Haitian people by the intervention of 
February 29, 2004, and it was formed with hostility. It was a government that 
was to be hostile to Lavalas and to help eliminate the movement from the 
political scene. It was a government that was a model of the kind of government 
that the three countries that intervened in Haiti would like to see at the helm 
of the country: a government that answers not to the population of the country 
but to foreign interests and international organizations like the IMF. As for 
an assessment of the last two years, I’m 56 years old, and these have easily 
been the most difficult and terrible years for the country I’ve ever seen.

First of all, there’s the level of repression against the poor people, against 
Lavalas. This government has allowed ex killers and killers from the army to 
integrate into the police into units that were nothing else but death squads 
and go into popular neighborhoods and assassinate people. And the economy has 
been a disaster. The thing the government did was fire 4,000 to 5000 people in 
a country with 70 percent unemployment. Of course this is not the type of 
government the Haitian people would like to see at the helm of the country.

RL: How does Haiti’s popular movement compare to those in other countries in 
Latin America?

PE: When Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced to leave the country in 1986, nobody 
expected that after 30 years of repression, the first 15 of which were sheer 
terror, that there would be this profound movement within the Haitian 
population that would turn into thousands of grassroots organizations. It was 
this movement that was the origin of the Haitian saga of the last 20 years. It 
was this movement rather than the political parties that stood up against the 
return of dictatorship. It was this movement that confronted the military 
government when it tried to control the election in 1987 and this movement that 
swept Aristide into power in 1990. And it was not the political parties, but 
again this movement that elected René Préval. Don’t believe for one minute that 
Lespwa [the coalition of political parties and organizations on whose ticket 
Préval ran for president] has been anything but a label that has been used for 
the election and a nice slogan, but it was that vast social movement that swept 
Préval into power. And I think that this movement that literally exploded onto 
the scene in 1986 preceded what we’ve seen in Venezuela, in Bolivia, and what 
may be appearing in Mexico and maybe it is the wave of the future for countries 
like Haiti in Latin America. Instead of trying to mimic countries of Europe, 
maybe we can forge regional tools for regional democracies. And I think that is 
what Haitians are trying to do.

RL: Has this popular movement grown stronger or weaker in the last 20 years?

PE: The popular movement in Haiti is very much alive, but it is already a bit 
better organized because it is battle scarred but battle hardened also. I’ve 
seen the crowds in 1986 and 1987, and the ones I’ve seen out lately are 
different. It’s already starting to resemble an army. There is more 
organization, there is more discipline, and I think there is more ability to 
stay the course. Of course, much remains to be done, for example, there is no 
substitute for a national coordination for such a movement. It should exist. 
For the moment, it is a very loose coordination. That’s where the new political 
leadership will emerge from. If anything, the last election signals the end of 
Haiti’s traditional political class. When I say traditional, I mean both those 
who come from the traditional right and the traditional left. You’ve seen the 
electoral results of the so-called socialists such as Paul Denis and Serge 
Gilles. They have been rejected by the Haitian people.

RL: What is the future of Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party in Haiti?

PE: Aristide has played a key historical role in the struggle of the Haitian 
people to define their own democracy, and I’m sure he will continue to be an 
influence in the future. Fanmi Lavalas is a political organization. But I don’t 
think it will be able to survive as a political organization simply because it 
really has no real autonomy. You could see how it became totally in disarray 
after president Aristide was kidnapped. It was what I would describe as a 
charismatic organization, one that depends strictly on its leader and after 
that you have nothing in terms of structure and in terms of capacity to 
formulate a political strategy.
A new grassroots movement will have to form that comes from the street and 
grassroots mobilizations. Lavalas is this movement, but Lavalas and Fanmi 
Lavalas, although related, are different things. Fanmi Lavalas is a political 
organization. Lavalas is a political philosophy, not a party. Lavalas and the 
popular movement are one in the same. It was the name coined for it by 
President Aristide. But he did not invent the reality of it, he just put a name 
on it. He doesn’t own it. It owns him.

RL: What lessons can be drawn from the overthrow of Aristide in February 2004 
and the ensuing two years?

PE: The lesson to be drawn is that it’s not enough to vote for somebody who is 
sympathetic to your cause. If you do not stay mobilized and define your 
political agenda and support that political agenda, what will happen is that 
either the president or the senators you elected are going to be extremely 
vulnerable to pressure exerted on them from the powers that be or they’ll start 
drifting to a more traditional type of power and start having their own agenda. 
And of course both things can happen. It’s obvious when you look at the last 
years of President Aristide, all the senators and deputies had their own 
personal agenda and were completely removed from what the people themselves 
wanted. So politicians, no matter what label they are under, have to be kept on 
a leash. And the leash is the grassroots movements permanently mobilized. That 
is one thing that the popular movement has learned.

RL: Would you include René Préval among the new group of leaders in Latin 
America who are pushing for regional integration and challenging U.S. hegemony 
in the region?

PE: Préval is a branch from the same tree. Préval started out like all of us, a 
Marxist, but he’s been really forged or transformed by the popular movement 
itself. He was very close to it. We went to school in the popular movement at 
the same time. He has a good feel for what the people of Haiti want and need. 
As a leader he does not have the charisma of Aristide, nor is he inclined or 
able to communicate with them the same way that President Aristide could. But I 
think that he has the trust of the Haitian people, which is very important. But 
if the Haitian people do not keep up their mobilization and continue to build 
it as a structured movement, he will fail. That is a certainty. He will fail 
because it is the fate of any leadership that is left by itself and does not 
have behind it a strong an organized people. He might be pushed so far away 
from the original agenda and what the people want that it would be the 
equivalent of him being overthrown.

RL: What will Préval be able to accomplish?

PE: From what Préval has indicated, he will address the problems of the poor 
majority of Haiti, including the most urgent issues such as terminating that 
exclusion, that quasi-apartheid that predominates in this country. His biggest 
obstacle might come from those within the Haitian elite and the traditional 
politicians, who will try to embrace him after failing to block his way. A 
president only has so much power, and he’s not the one actually doing 
everything. He depends on a team, and he depends on popular support.

The members of the elite and political parties could have too much influence. 
What they couldn’t win in the election, they could win by buddying up to 
Préval. I’ve heard that everywhere he’s gone, he’s gone with members of the 
moneyed elite. That’s all fine and dandy, he cannot actually govern against the 
elite all out, but he cannot govern for the elite either. I hope they won’t try 
to destabilize in the same way they tried to destabilize Aristide. The last two 
years have been such a fiasco, I don’t know if they have the stomach for 
something as terrible and disastrous. But Préval will certainly be facing a lot 
of pressure. And I think somehow the Haitian people know that. All I expect 
from his presidency is to have the space to organize rather than facing a truly 
hostile government. But he will be under a lot of constraints.

RL: How can Préval push through reforms that benefit the poor majority without 
the elite sabotaging his effort?

PE: We start maybe by having the kind of dialogue with the moneyed elite that 
the people of the South African majority had with the white minority when the 
one person-one vote principal was being adopted. Obviously the elite want some 
protection, but they will only have it by exchanging their privileges for 
rights. It is obvious that things cannot continue as they are, so if there are 
people who are reasonable within this elite, some compromise might be reached 
between them and the vast majority of people who have been excluded. The 
priorities should be set right. Education, health care, production. These 
should be the priorities. We must have a country that produces. The elite must 
be engaged in production of wealth rather than being truly parasites. Laws must 
be voted by the new parliament and be acted upon to close progressively that 
horrible gap that exists between the tiny elite and the huge majority. That’s 
the only way to go. And if the elite persist in trying to stand in the way of 
progress I think they will have to go the way of the Cuban elites that had a 
field day until Fidel came along. Maybe they are more ready to be persuaded 
after the last two years. It was the last desperate attempt to stem the flow of 
history. The last two years have not been particularly happy for the Haitian 
elites either. The Haitian people as a whole have suffered the consequences of 
Aristide’s overthrow.

Reed Lindsay is a freelance journalist who has been based in Port-au-Prince 
since October 2004.