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29402: Lucas: Management Without Principle: A Familiar Path to Chaos in Haiti (fwd)
From: Stanley Lucas <maloukwi@yahoo.com>
Management Without Principle:
A Familiar Path to Chaos in Haiti
By Stanley Lucas*
Executive Summary
- The newly elected Preval Government has been exhibiting decision-making
reminiscent of the recent past, specifically the period between 1994 and 2004.
The result of decision-making during that period led the country to the chaos
of February 2004 with the haphazard departure of Aristide.
- The Preval Administration has outlined priorities in line with
international governance standards, such as rule of law, human rights
protection and free and fair elections. But there is no action plan on how to
achieve these standards. And, in fact, the actions being taken are starting to
go against these standards.
- If the Preval Administration continues down this path, Haiti will be led
into chaos yet again. Haitian society and the international community have an
opportunity to help change the course by requiring the Haitian government to
meet the international guidelines for receiving international aid that all
other countries must meet. This will help ensure that there is an appropriate
framework in place to support Haiti’s nascent democracy.
The Aristide Legacy
In October 1994, the United States sent 20,000 troops to reinstate Jean
Bertrand Aristide to power and provided more than US$3 billion to support
democracy-building in Haiti. Under the theory that all politics are local, the
international community pressed Aristide to come up with his own plan for
democracy and Haiti’s future and to take ownership of the effort rather than
having it led by the international community. Aristide consulted his closest
advisors – Philippe Rouzier, Leslie Voltaire and Leslie Delatour – and outlined
a plan that focused on stability and security by promoting the rule of law and
strengthening the police; initiating a dialogue with Haiti’s civil society;
organizing free and fair elections and promoting good governance; privatizing
industry; fighting corruption and drug trafficking; respecting human rights and
promoting development.
On paper, the plan was a good one. But it had two serious flaws: 1. it was
merely a laundry list of objectives with no real action plan; and 2. it
empowered Aristide to be the sole owner of the plan rather than taking an
approach based on “checks and balances” and supporting the leadership as well
as non-government actors. Essentially, the international community backed one
man.
The results were disastrous. From 1994 to 2004, Aristide and his associates
did just the opposite of their stated goals. Aristide turned against the
United States calling the government an “evil power” and developed was a
politicized police force and a network of gangs loyal to the government. These
gangs operated above the law and were free to take whatever measures they
wanted to stamp out any opposition. They burned opposition party headquarters
and the private residences of opponents.
Independent judges were dismissed replaced by more cooperative people and a
network of paid international lawyers acted as mercenaries for the cause.
Elections were rigged three separate times (April 1997, May 2000 and November
2000). Parliament was dissolved; privatization turned into bribery; corruption
became rampant, drug trafficking rose to unprecedented levels. With Aristide
support, drug traffickers controlled the police, the presidency and its
security apparatus, the judicial system and financed rigged elections. Members
of Parliament loyal to the president were linked to cocaine trafficking,
including the president of the Senate Fourrel Celestin now serving a life
sentence in a Florida jail. Political assassination and violations of human
rights by the president and his supporters became a normal practice, well known
journalists were killed including Brignol Lindor, Jacque Roche. The dean of
Haiti’s state university was severely beaten. Dialogue, a hallmark
of the 1994 plan, was later used merely as a tool that was used to flush out
opposition.
In the end, Aristide’s gangs took on a life and agenda of their own. There
was extensive infighting over power, control and wealth – complete chaos. This
infighting led to the events of February 2004 and complete collapse of the
government when Aristide resigned and was helicoptered out of the country by US
forces as his gang of thugs moved into the capital.
Lessons Learned
In 1996 despite the early signs indicating the government was heading down
this path, the donor community remained steadfast in its position that Aristide
should lead the efforts to put in place a democratic Haiti as he was the
elected leader. Parliament, political parties, Haitian civil society and some
donor organizations decried the situation and made numerous pleas to the
international community for support -- for free and fair elections, for
corruption-fighting, for efforts to redress the lack of transparency in Haitian
government, for job creation programs, and on and on -- all to no avail..
Now in 2006, we are again seeing signs of a return to Aristide politics. But
this time, we must ensure that the voices of reason and principle prevail.
This time we (meaning the donor community and Haitian civil society actors)
must insist that the government puts into place a real action plan, rather than
the list of objectives that they currently have. Haitian leaders have begun to
attack the international community for not providing aid in a timely manner,
but international actors much resist the attacks and focus on getting a plan
and seeing the actions to fulfill standard requirements for receiving that aid.
To date there have been no capacity building efforts or measures by the Haitian
government to ensure that aid is implemented effectively. This time, no matter
what, Haiti must become a reliable partner, a reliable international actor and
results-oriented.
The Current Administration
For the past three months, the Haitian government has made some questionable
decisions that, if not redressed, will have a negative impact on the
democratization process. It should be noted that Preval has made some personal
efforts to reach out to various actors of Haiti’s political spectrum, but time
will tell whether or not these talks are truly intended to establish a real
political dialogue or if they are purely cosmetic.
- First, by retrieving the charges against Jean Bertrand Aristide in a Florida
court the government is sending a signal that accountability is not a priority
and will make it difficult to pursue others.
- Second, the government pressured judges to free Aristide’s political allies
involved in political assassinations.
- Third, the government named Samba Boukman, a co-chief of Haiti’s Operation
Baghdad, a gang-organized campaign of violence, as a member of the official
presidential disarmament commission. Operation Baghdad has resulted in the
murder of 1,821 Haitian citizens, decapitation of 108 police officers, 237
women raped, 500 people kidnapped, including Americans and Canadians.
- Fourth, by leaning on their close allies within the Provisional Electoral
Council, the government has delayed – and continues to delay – the completion
of the remaining legislative elections and the organization of the municipal
and local elections.
- Five, efforts to politicize the police have resumed. The new inspector
general and member of KOREGA in the Grand Anse has a well known history of
violence.
- Six, a resumption of targeted attacks against journalists including Vario
Serant of Alterpresse.
- Seven, continuing political assassinations, with the most recent killing of
Guy Francois.
- Eight, no serious efforts to combat the gangs. Rather the approach has been
to appease them. They have essentially “blackmailed” the government – a
worrisome trend.
Understanding Those in Power
Currently there is a struggle between two major groups that make up this
Administration as well as past Administrations. The first is a group of
technocrats willing to play by the rules and promote democracy and good
governance. They are at the nexus of international experience and domestic
expertise. They are generally well-educated, idealistic and motivated. Most
have peasant roots but have staked a serious claim in their country’s future.
Unfortunately, they do not have the upper hand.
The second is a minority group who knows no other way to rule other than by
mobocracy. They lack a moral compass. They believe in political violence, and
use corruption, kidnappings, political assassination, rape, drug trafficking
and other illegal activities to secure their positions of power. For them, the
United States is an “evil power”, and the international community is weak and
can be manipulated. Appointing Samba Boukman, a well-known criminal, as a
member of this official disarmament commission is a way for this group to show
it does not “report to” the international community. This group of Haitian
leaders believes that the plights of Haiti should be blamed on the IMF, the
World Bank and others – but not them. Unfortunately for now, these people do
have the upper hand.
What Can be Done to Change the Path?
A couple months after the chaos of February 2004, a sense of security and
stability was reestablished, human rights violations decreased, and an
electoral body was put in place. In addition, relations with the international
community strengthened and there was an allocation of US$1.2 billion to Haiti
for various restoration and capacity building programs. Despite the serious
challenges left by the Aristide regime, and as a transition authority, the
interim government was doing a good job of moving the process forward. In 2005
and 2006, concerned Haitian citizens, supported by the international community,
heavily invested in the transition process. The 2006 elections constituted the
first step for une sortie de crise – or a way out of the political crisis.
Now that an elected government is in place, more needs to be done to
strengthen Haiti both politically and economically, but with serious
accountability. Haitians, supported by the international community, should
continue to mobilize and push for a comprehensive roadmap to strengthen
democracy and eliminate mobocracy.
The following is a list of recommendations on how to achieve this.
Essentially, it requires that Haiti’s government leaders go back to the basics
and spend time working, structuring, and organizing rather than undertaking
endless travel to international conferences that will not contribute to Haiti’s
stability and reconstruction. There is much talk about Constitutional reform.
Constitutional reform is not at all a priority (unless perhaps one is
interested in “President for Life”). It seems that some foreign mercenaries
preoccupied by advancing their careers are more focused on constitutional
reform than on taking care of the Haitian people themselves. Haitians are
seeking a better security environment and opportunities that will help them
provide for their families – not constitutional reforms. So let’s focus on
what is priority.
- Security: There is a need for a national security strategy with the input
of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches. Input from political
parties, civil society should be sought out and encouraged. Gang members,
thugs and drug dealers are still linked to state affairs and cannot be allowed
to participate in official functions. The Haitian government must put a vetting
process in place to keep criminals out of its ranks – and have the courage to
clear out criminals and others unworthy of the public trust who are already in
government. The strengthening of the police including recruitment, training,
purchasing of arms in the United States should be supervised by a multifaceted
commission with veto power formed by representatives of the Executive branch,
the Judiciary, human rights organizations and other civil society
organizations. Building a new force, as the Preval Administration has proposed,
seems premature and dangerous. Why build a new force when the
current one has not be strengthened and cleaned from its ranks the cronies
recruited in 1994-2004?
- A Policy Agenda : After three months in office, it is time for Haitian
government to present the international donors with a strategic economic,
social and political action plan. Not a Program to Assist Sinecures (PAS).
Their current plan is disorganized and is not comprehensive. It is a list of
US$7 billion in projects without any context as to how they fit into Haiti's
overall goals. This plan should include projects in the areas of education,
infrastructure, agriculture, health, security, economic development, and
environmental protection. Equally important, this plan should take into
account international funding requirements and the US$850 million available.
- Efficiency in the State Sector: Haiti’s revenue generating sectors are
currently organized to provide kickbacks (bribery) to political allies and
cronies. This corruption must stop. The government should show their
performance in generating its own revenue from its revenue generating sectors,
such as telecommunications, ports, and the tax authority.
- Strengthen Domestic Management Capability and Accountability: The Haitian
government needs to build up the capacity to absorb international funds before
they are received. The government needs to put in place a human infrastructure
that is capable of project and fund management and remove those who are
incompetent. They should recruit capable professionals from the Diaspora and
within Haiti into government. There are too many unqualified people in the
government and it is severely limiting progress. As a capable management team
comes in, they must also be subject to strengthened rules to ensure proper
oversight and accountability so that the cycle of corruption that has weakened
the infrastructure in government in the past is not repeated.
- Support Haiti's Private Sector: Haiti has an eager Chamber of Commerce with
10 chapters throughout the country. They desperately lack information on how
to function as a Chamber as well as the ability to carry out the various trade
and economic promotion activities normally run by Chambers. In addition,
there is a need for micro-credit programs and women's development projects,
including women entrepreneurs – a particular opportunity for the IADB. Haiti
needs jobs. One way to encourage job creation would be for the U.S. Congress
to pass the HOPE legislation that would lower tariffs in certain sectors and
promote greater U.S.-Haiti trade. Hopefully the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, Representative Bill Thomas, and Representative Charles Rangel will
do their best to get a vote during Congress’ lame duck session in November.
Let’s encourage this effort.
- Timely Elections: There is some concern that there is a deliberate effort
to implode the Provisional Electoral Council in order to delay the remaining
district Legislative and nationwide Municipal and Local elections scheduled for
December 3, 2006. The Haitian voters at the local level and Haitian political
parties are getting impatient and the international community has a US$120
million investment in these elections. If they are not carried out in a
timely, free and fair manner, this government will have undermined all the
current and previous efforts to build viable democratic process.
- Arms Control: When the arms embargo is lifted by the United States,
mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that arms do not fall into the
network of gangs and criminals – as in the 1994-2004 period when the Aristide
government actually armed the gangs – but get to legitimate police officers.
The National Police Force and a credible commission formed of human rights
activist should help enforce this policy.
* Stanley Lucas worked on Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa and Latin
America. Lucas is currently the Executive Director of the Washington Democracy
Project
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