30420: HaitiAnalysis (Review) A Review of Alex Dupuy's New Book (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From:  haitianalysis-at-gmail-dot-com


"Between Two Worlds, Precariously": A Review of Alex Dupuy's New Book
http://www.haitianalysis.com/2007/4/26/between-two-worlds-precariously-a-review-of-alex-dupuy-s-new-book

By: Regan Boychuk - HaitiAnalysis.com

A review of Alex Dupuy's The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
international community, and Haiti (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007)

Alex Dupuy's work is counted by fellow Haitian scholar Patrick
Bellegarde-Smith as among the "remarkably sage, wise, and balanced… analyses
of what ails Haiti". His peer places Dupuy among those Haitian academics
that are "passionate, detached, and fair."[1] These and other leading
scholars on Haiti occupy an interesting place between Haiti and its US
neighbor, which has always played a significant role in Haitian affairs. As
Haitians, they are able to offer valuable insight into the domestic forces
that shape that small Caribbean country. But as academics working in the
United States, they are also in a position to understand and explain the
foreign forces also shaping Haiti.

Morally, they have a choice to make as to which forces they choose to
highlight in their analyses: the foreign or the domestic. As Haitians, they
should focus on the domestic determinates of Haitian history because it is
those that they have the most influence over. On the other hand, it is easy
for Americans to denounce the crimes and failings of Haitians, but rather
more appropriate for them to focus on the role of their own government, over
which they have a considerable amount of influence.

Fine scholarship can approach an issue from either side, but regardless of
which angle one chooses to focus on, Haiti would seem to demand both sides
at least be taken into account in order to fully understand its fascinating
history. Dupuy's analysis straddles that line between domestic and foreign
forces, placing much blame on the US while never letting Jean-Bertrand
Aristide and his supporters off the hook. What follows is an attempt to
evaluate how successful Dupuy is in balancing these two approaches.

Dupuy was born and raised in Haiti and studied there and in the US, where he
is now a professor of sociology at Connecticut's Wesleyan University. His
The Prophet and Power is among the first comprehensive academic attempts to
explain the phenomenon that is Aristide, Haiti's twice democratically
elected (1990 and 2000) and twice deposed (1991 and 2004) president.

In the first few chapters, Dupuy places Haiti and its history within the
context of imperialism and global capitalism, offering an interesting
narrative within which to understand Haiti within international affairs.
However, little of this material is new; more than half of the book's barely
200 pages is reprinted or revised work previously published by Dupuy. Of
much greater interest, then, is Dupuy's analysis of Aristide's second term
(2001-2004), which represents the bulk of the book's new material and is a
period that is yet to receive a great deal of academic attention.

Much of what Dupuy has written could be interpreted as support for those
that argue the importance of the West's role in Haiti. Dupuy notes that the
US State Department has "historically relied on dictatorial regimes to
preserve the existing social system and prevent the coming to power of
elements potentially inimical to U.S. interests" (p. 63), that the US "must
become an interventionist, imperialist state to preserve the world order
that serves its interests" (p. 4), and that "it is clear that the
administration of President George W. Bush forced [Aristide] out." (p. 173)
"What [the US, Canada, France] and the international organizations wanted
above all," Dupuy tells us, "was to make Haiti safe for the Washington
Consensus by restoring the traditional pact of domination between the
Haitian economic elite and the state." (p. 194)

Dupuy argues that there can be little doubt the congressionally funded
International Republican Institute "spearheaded the international effort to
undermine and eventually topple Aristide" (p. 148) and was "instrumental" in
forming and financing the political opposition that "had no intention of
ever participating in elections with Aristide still in power and spurned any
and all overtures made by Aristide to resolve the crisis peacefully." (pp.
158-59) "[A]ll the public pronouncements notwithstanding, the three powers
[the United States, France, and Canada] simply let the rebel forces do their
work and give them the excuse they needed to compel Aristide to leave." (p.
174)

At the same time, much of what Dupuy writes regarding the US' role leaves
something to be desired. In a rather incredible explanation of the US
invasion of Haiti to reinstall Aristide in 1994, Dupuy claims "The passive
and active resistance of a majority of the population against the military
junta that toppled Aristide compelled the United States to lead a UN
multinational intervention force to remove the junta and restore Aristide to
power in October 1994." (p. xiv) This gratuitously generous interpretation
of US motives ignores a great deal of evidence that points towards the US'
support of said junta and its use of their repression to force Aristide to
accept various conditions for his return.[2] The US worked to destroy
Haitian resistance to the military junta, to the point that a May 1994
headline in the International Herald Tribune declared: "Grass Roots
Democracy in Haiti: All But Dead". The Washington Post reported that
diplomats and human rights workers thought the Haitian army and its allies
had damaged democratic institutions and grassroots organizations to such an
extent that they would take years to rebuild.[3] Without belittling the
brave resistance Haitians managed against the US-backed junta, I know of no
meaningful evidence suggesting it was Haitians' struggle that led the US to
return Aristide to Haiti.

When discussing the interim 'government' that replaced Aristide in 2004,
Dupuy's language is often vivid. He describes Latortue's regime as
"unconstitutional and illegitimate" (p. xvi) and suggests that "the main
objective of the Latortue government was to pacify the country by cracking
down on Aristide's supporters, especially but not exclusively the armed
gangs of chimès in the Lavalas strongholds in the ghettos of Port-au-Prince,
and to prepare new elections that hopefully would bring to power a candidate
from the bourgeoisie or the middle class that was hostile to Aristide and
what he represented symbolically, if not in practice: the empowerment of the
impoverished majority and the creation of a democracy that defended their
interests." (p. 195)

"Though it came to power undemocratically," Dupuy notes, "the new government
formed by Prime Minister Latortue had the full backing of the United States,
France, Canada, and the international financial institutions that had denied
support (political and economic) to the democratically elected Aristide
government." (p. 175) In support of the Western powers' goal of "restoring
the traditional pact of domination between the Haitian economic elite and
the state" (p. 194), "Latortue and his government cracked down not only on
Aristide's armed supporters, known as chimères (in French) or chimès (in
Creole), but also on the populations of the slums, especially of
Port-au-Prince, that were considered Aristide strongholds. Latortue also
persecuted the key leaders or activists of Lavalas in an effort to weaken
the party or cause it to splinter before the elections. That strategy
succeeded". (p. 21)

Though Dupuy offers few details of the Western-backed repression endured by
Haitians during Latortue's rule, he still draws strong conclusions:

The number of people killed and injured, in addition to those who were
victims of rape and other physical abuse, was undoubtedly higher than
[estimates reporting about 1,500 people killed during Latortue's regime].
…And, as many human rights reports made clear, the police and their
affiliates were responsible for the majority of the killings. As mentioned,
the Latortue government aligned itself with former army soldiers and
paramilitaries to help the police carry out its campaign of repression
against Aristide gangs and key Lavalas leaders. (pp. 189-90)

Read in a different way, however, much of The Prophet and Power supports the
well worn arguments claiming that Aristide had transformed from a popular
democrat into a repressive autocrat, essentially ensuring his own downfall.

Dupuy recognizes that, by 1996-97, Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party "was
unquestionably the dominant political force in Haiti." (p. 137) Bared by
Haiti's constitution from serving consecutive presidential terms, Aristide
would run again for president in 2000. There is no space here to sort out
the controversy surrounding Haiti's May 2000 legislative and November 2000
presidential elections;[4] instead, the focus will be on what Dupuy has to
say about them. As is common, Dupuy suggests that – despite not having been
in office for 5 years – Aristide manipulated Haiti's provisional electoral
council (CEP) in an effort to secure absolute power. According to Dupuy:
"Aristide was determined to govern this time with his party in complete
control of government, which required him and his party to win at least
two-thirds of the seats in parliament. This would buffer Aristide and his
prime minister from any possible censure or a vote of no confidence in
parliament." (pp. 139-40) As is also common, Dupuy offers no explanation of
how he was able to do all this despite not being elected until six months
later. Adding exponential hyperbole to this hollow analysis, Dupuy makes the
patently absurd claim that the disputed vote-counting methodology used in a
handful of the hundreds of electoral races "disenfranchis[ed] millions of
voters". (p. 139)

According to Dupuy, once elected, "Aristide relied on armed gangs, the
police, and authoritarian practices to suppress his opponents …That strategy
did not work, though, as his government became increasingly discredited and
his popularity waned. …Consequently, unlike in 1991, the majority of the
population did not rally to save Aristide from being forced out in 2004 or
clamor for his return afterward. …Instead, the majority pressed for new
elections to restore legitimacy to government—in which Aristide could not
participate. The majority of Haitians, then, had moved beyond Aristide." (p.
xv) This is the essence of Dupuy's characterization of Aristide's second
term: increasingly authoritarian, decreasingly popular. The evidence he
offers to support his view, unfortunately, leaves a great deal to be
desired.

On one page (160), Dupuy concedes that "Aristide may not have been directly
responsible for all the politically motivated criminal acts committed by
local officials, his grassroots supporters, or the police", but writes on
another (p. 156): "To be sure, everyone knew the chimès were working for
Aristide and others". Quite soberly, Dupuy adds "…but such links had to be
proved." The problem, however, is that Dupuy makes little effort at proof.
For example, Dupuy writes that "the government relied on its armed gangs to
intimidate, and even kill, members of the press and of the opposition" (p.
178) without mentioning anything specific or citing any sources. Other
times, when Dupuy does cite a source to support such claims, the source
cited offers no support: "Aristide made the situation worse for himself by
unleashing the chimès who went on a rampage in the days preceding his
departure, thereby reinforcing his enemies' claims that the country would be
plunged into a bloodbath unless Aristide was removed." (p. 172) The 39-page
Amnesty International report Dupuy cites in support of the above statement
includes a grand total of one paragraph on human rights abuses against
Aristide opponents.[5] Though one would never suspect it from the tone of
Dupuy's analysis, Amnesty International attributed a total of around 20-30
killings to the police and Fanmi Lavalas supporters between 2000 and
2003.[6]

At one point, Dupuy essentially concedes that there is no evidence that
Aristide created and wielded the chimès – but adds that no evidence is
evidence enough for him: "There is disagreement on Aristide's role in
creating the chimès.[7] …In my view, however, it is immaterial whether or
not Aristide had a direct role in creating and directing the chimès. As
Clive Thomas noted, authoritarian regimes and rulers have often made use of
armed civilians to do the government's dirty work without giving these
groups official sanction or status. …This is exactly how Aristide would use
the chimès. He denied being connected to them, but would never condemn or
declare them illegal, fight against them, or hold them accountable for their
actions." (pp. 144-45) Because Aristide denied control of the chimes, we are
supposed to join Dupuy in believing that his denial proves he is behind
them. It is quite revealing that an academic study by a leading scholar on
Haiti is unable to offer any evidence to support the oft-repeated claim that
Aristide orchestrated the chimès.

At other times, Dupuy contradicts his repeated claims that Aristide had lost
popular support: "there is no doubt that despite all that had happened to
erode that support, Aristide still resonated with a large sector of the
Haitian population, especially with the poor majority." March 2002 "polls
confirmed that Aristide and his FL party would still likely win an electoral
contest against the [opposition] CD." (pp. 164-65) Indeed, months after the
coup, the US embassy in Haiti admitted "if the election was held today, the
Lavalas Party would win."[8] When you combine this with the massive (and
virtually unreported) demonstrations supporting Aristide in his final
days,[9] statements like the following are simply outrageous: "Except for
armed gangs and some supporters who remained loyal to him, the population as
a whole offered no resistance to the rebels from disbanded Haitian Army that
forced him from office and did not clamor for his reinstatement as they had
in 1991." (p. 2)

It would seem to me that any analysis of Aristide's Haiti hoping to be
accurately described as "remarkably sage, wise, and balanced" would need to
make honest, good-faith attempts to understand and explain the role Western
powers played in Aristide's fall, paying particular attention to the
international sanctions and their support for Aristide's opposition. His
failure to even mention the "Ottawa Initiative on Haiti", a January 2003
Canadian-hosted meeting where a group of high-level North American,
European, and Latin American diplomats discussed plans for President
Aristide's removal and an ensuing military occupation is but one
shortcoming.[10] To a large extent, Dupuy tells both sides of the heated
debate surrounding Aristide's legacy what they want to hear instead of
weighing the evidence and drawing the conclusions that follow.

Any "passionate, detached, and fair" study would also seem to have to
evaluate the extent gang activity in Haiti was politically rather than
simply criminally motivated, rather than simply making confident assertions
in the absence of evidence. One might also want to consider whether a
government opposed by 'the West' has any right to self-defense against
foreign supported war criminals threatening to return the country to an era
of violent repression. Unfortunately, Dupuy's study leaves a great deal to
be desired. This has not prevented another reviewer from fawning over the
"attention to detail" in "his persuasive account" – "exceptional in getting
his facts straight" – while lamenting that Dupuy may have been "too hard on
the Democratic Convergence" (Aristide's opposition).[11]

The wait for a fair and detached evaluation of Haiti's most recent period of
darkness continues…

*Regan Boychuk completed his MA in political science at Toronto's York
University in September 2005. If you are interested in his MA 'thesis'
exploring Canada's role in the February 2004 coup, he can be reached at
reganboychuk@hotmail.com.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The breached citadel, revised and
updated edn. (Toronto, ON: Canadian Scholars', 2004), p. 261.

[2] On the US role in supporting Haitian death squads between 1991 and 1994,
see the series of articles by Alan Nairn: "The eagle is landing", Nation
(New York), vol. 259, no. 10 (3 October 1994), pp. 344-48; "Behind Haiti's
paramilitaries", Nation (New York), vol. 259, no. 13 (24 October 1994), pp.
458-61; "He's our SOB", Nation (New York), vol. 259, no. 14 (31 October
1994), pp. 481-82; "Our payroll, Haitian hit", Nation (New York), vol. 261,
no. 11 (9 October 1995), pp. 369, 373-74; "Haiti under the gun", Nation (New
York), vol. 262, no. 2 (8/15 January 1996), pp. 11-15; and "Haiti under
cloak", Nation (New York), vol. 262, no. 8 (26 February 1996), pp. 4-5.

On the first Bush administration's undermining of the international embargo
against Haiti's military junta, see Thomas Friedman, "Regional group agrees
to increase penalties on Haiti", New York Times, 9 October 1991, p. A3.

On the Clinton administration's undermining of the embargo and their efforts
to prevent their moves from becoming public, see the series of articles by
John Solomon: "Agency head failed to stop Texaco leak, citing Bush treasury
secretary", Associated Press, 18 September 1994; "Treasury secretary asks
for probe in Haiti embargo case", Associated Press, 20 September 1994;
"Assets control director ignored advice to remove self from Texaco case",
Associated Press, 29 September 1994; "OFAC director was 'protecting' Brady
in Texaco-Haiti case", Associated Press, 1 October 1994; "Trade embargo
office stripped of its enforcement divisions", Associated Press, 5 May 1995;
"Treasury official found to have met with probe subjects outside office",
Associated Press, 10 May 1996; and "Charging administration ignored
evidence, lawmaker seeks GAO probe", Associated Press, 13 June 1996.

On the US role in pressuring Aristide to accept economic conditions for his
return, see Alan Nairn, "Aristide banks on austerity", Multinational Monitor
(Washington), vol. 16, nos. 7/8 (July/August 1994), pp. 7-9.

On the Clinton administration's use of the junta's terror to pressure
Aristide, see Mark Danner, "Haiti on the verge", New York Review of Books,
vol. 40, no. 18 (4 November 1993), p. 26.

[3] Douglas Farah, "Democracy movement snuffed at birth", Washington Post, 9
May 1994, pp. A1ff; reprinted as "Grass roots democracy in Haiti: All but
dead", International Herald Tribune (Paris), 10 May 1994, p. 3.

[4] The facts are convincingly sorted out in Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center,
"Elections 2000: Participatory democracy in Haiti", February 2001.

[5] See Amnesty International, "Breaking the cycle of violence: A last
chance for Haiti?", AMR 36/038/2004 (June 2004), p. 21.

[6] Peter Hallward, "Option zero in Haiti", New Left Review (London), second
series, no. 27 (May-June 2004), pp. 40-41. For the period after Aristide's
removal, see Athena R. Kolbe and Royce A. Hutson, "Human rights abuse and
other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: A random survey of
households", Lancet (London), vol. 368, no. 9538 (2 September 2006), pp.
864-73 and "Clarification: Human rights abuse and other criminal violations
in Port-au-Prince, Haiti", Lancet (London), vol. 369, no. 9559 (3 February
2007), pp. 355-56.

[7] Dupuy cites Maurice Lemoine, "Titide's downfall: From prophet of the
slums to controlling ruler", Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), September 2004,
which confidently states: "There is no proof that Aristide had any hand in
running these groups."

[8] Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean, "A people's
fact finding investigation to Haiti: 18-24 April 2004", sec. 2.

[9] Christina Leadlay, "Clearing Haiti's smoke and mirrors", Embassy
(Ottawa), vol. 1, no. 41 (16-22 February 2005), p. 7.

[10] One of the few attempts to appreciate the impact of the international
embargo against Aristide's Haiti can be found in Paul Farmer, Mary C. Smith
Fawzi, and Patrice Nevil, "Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti", Lancet
(London), vol. 361, no. 9355 (1 February 2003), pp. 420-23.

For some of the valuable accounts Dupuy did not utilize, see Ron Howell,
"Probing US ties to Haiti coup", Newsday (New York), 17 March 2004, p. A22
and Joshua Kurlantzick, "The coup connection: How an organization financed
by the US government has been promoting the overthrow of elected leaders
abroad", Mother Jones (San Francisco), vol. 29, no. 6 (November/December
2004), pp. 15-17.

On US shipments of arms to Aristide's opposition, see Nancy San Martin,
"Dominican army tightens watch", Miami Herald, 30 November 2002, pp. A1ff;
Nancy San Martin, "Dominican and US troops' joint exercise reduced in
scope", Miami Herald, 20 February 2003, p. A8; Bryan Bender, "Aristide
backers blame US for ouster", Boston Globe, 1 March 2004, pp. A1ff;
"Commission investigation finds US and Dominican Republic backed Haitian
'rebels'", Häiti Progrès (New York/Port-au-Prince), vol. 22, no. 3 (31 March
2004) and Control Arms Campaign, "The call for tough arms controls: Voices
from Haiti", January 2006: "Between 2003 and 2005, a quarter of weapons
smuggled out of Miami, Pompano Beach, and Fort Lauderdale in Florida were
destined for Haiti, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms." (p. 13)

On the Ottawa Initiative, see Michel Vastel, "Haïti mise en tutelle par
l'ONU?", L'Actualité (Montreal), vol. 28, no. 4 (15 March 2003), pp. 14-15;
Raymond Joseph, "Preparing for civil war", New York Sun, 7 March 2003; and
Yves Engler and Anthony Fenton, Canada in Haiti: Waging war on the poor
majority (Vancouver, BC: RED/Fernwood, 2005). Engler and Fenton's account is
based, in part, on a series of Canadian government documents released in
response to their Access to Information Act request.

[11] Bob Corbett, "Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community and
Haiti", January 2007.