30520: Boychuk (Book review): Dupuy's The Prophet and Power (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: Regan Boychuk <reganboychuk@hotmail.com>


http://www.haitianalysis.com/2007/4/26/between-two-worlds-precariously-a-review-
of-alex-dupuy-s-new-book

Between Two Worlds, Precariously<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns =
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

Dupuy, Alex. The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
international community, and Haiti. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007. ISBN 0-7425-3831-1. 288pp. $29.95 U.S.

Reviewed by Regan Boychuk



A

lex Dupuy’s work is counted by fellow Haitian scholar Patrick
Bellegarde-Smith as among the “remarkably sage, wise, and balanced…
analyses of what ails Haiti”. His peer places Dupuy among those Haitian
academics that are “passionate, detached, and fair.”[1] These and other
leading scholars on Haiti occupy an interesting place between Haiti and
its US neighbor, which has always played a significant role in Haitian
affairs. As Haitians, they are able to offer valuable insight into the
domestic forces that shape that small Caribbean country. But as academics
working in the United States, they are also in a position to understand
and explain the foreign forces also shaping Haiti.



Morally, they have a choice to make as to which forces they choose to
highlight in their analyses: the foreign or the domestic. As Haitians,
they should focus on the domestic determinates of Haitian history because
it is those that they have the most influence over. On the other hand, it
is easy for Americans to denounce the crimes and failings of Haitians,
but rather more appropriate for them to focus on the role of their own
government, over which they have a considerable amount of influence.



Fine scholarship can approach an issue from either side, but regardless
of which angle one chooses to focus on, Haiti would seem to demand both
sides at least be taken into account in order to fully understand its
fascinating history. Dupuy’s analysis straddles that line between
domestic and foreign forces, placing much blame on the US while never
letting Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his supporters off the hook. What
follows is an attempt to evaluate how successful Dupuy is in balancing
these two approaches.



D

upuy was born and raised in Haiti and studied there and in the US, where
he is now a professor of sociology at Connecticut’s Wesleyan University.
His The Prophet and Power is among the first comprehensive academic
attempts to explain the phenomenon that is Aristide, Haiti’s twice
democratically elected (1990 and 2000) and twice deposed (1991 and 2004)
president.



In the first few chapters, Dupuy places Haiti and its history within the
context of imperialism and global capitalism, offering an interesting
narrative within which to understand Haiti within international affairs.
However, little of this material is new; more than half of the book’s
barely 200 pages is reprinted or revised work previously published by
Dupuy. Of much greater interest, then, is Dupuy’s analysis of Aristide’s
second term (2001-2004), which represents the bulk of the book’s new
material and is a period that is yet to receive a great deal of academic
attention.



Much of what Dupuy has written could be interpreted as support for those
that argue the importance of the West’s role in Haiti. Dupuy notes that
the US State Department has “historically relied on dictatorial regimes
to preserve the existing social system and prevent the coming to power of
elements potentially inimical to U.S. interests” (p. 63), that the US
“must become an interventionist, imperialist state to preserve the world
order that serves its interests” (p. 4), and that “it is clear that the
administration of President George W. Bush forced [Aristide] out.” (p.
173) “What [the US, Canada, France] and the international organizations
wanted above all,” Dupuy tells us, “was to make Haiti safe for the
Washington Consensus by restoring the traditional pact of domination
between the Haitian economic elite and the state.” (p. 194)



Dupuy argues that there can be little doubt the congressionally funded
International Republican Institute “spearheaded the international effort
to undermine and eventually topple Aristide” (p. 148) and was
“instrumental” in forming and financing the political opposition that
“had no intention of ever participating in elections with Aristide still
in power and spurned any and all overtures made by Aristide to resolve
the crisis peacefully.” (pp. 158-59)  “[A]ll the public pronouncements
notwithstanding, the three powers [the United States, France, and Canada]
simply let the rebel forces do their work and give them the excuse they
needed to compel Aristide to leave.” (p. 174)



At the same time, much of what Dupuy writes regarding the US’ role leaves
something to be desired. In a rather incredible explanation of the US
invasion of Haiti to reinstall Aristide in 1994, Dupuy claims “The
passive and active resistance of a majority of the population against the
military junta that toppled Aristide compelled the United States to lead
a UN multinational intervention force to remove the junta and restore
Aristide to power in October 1994.” (p. xiv) This gratuitously generous
interpretation of US motives ignores a great deal of evidence that points
towards the US’ support of said junta and its use of their repression to
force Aristide to accept various conditions for his return.[2] The US
worked to destroy Haitian resistance to the military junta, to the point
that a May 1994 headline in the International Herald Tribune declared:
“Grass Roots Democracy in Haiti: All But Dead”. The Washington Post
reported that diplomats and human rights workers thought the Haitian army
and its allies had damaged democratic institutions and grassroots
organizations to such an extent that they would take years to rebuild.[3]
Without belittling the brave resistance Haitians managed against the
US-backed junta, I know of no meaningful evidence suggesting it was
Haitians’ struggle that led the US to return Aristide to Haiti.



When discussing the interim ‘government’ that replaced Aristide in 2004,
Dupuy’s language is often vivid. He describes Latortue’s regime as
“unconstitutional and illegitimate” (p. xvi) and suggests that “the main
objective of the Latortue government was to pacify the country by
cracking down on Aristide’s supporters, especially but not exclusively
the armed gangs of chimès in the Lavalas strongholds in the ghettos of
Port-au-Prince, and to prepare new elections that hopefully would bring
to power a candidate from the bourgeoisie or the middle class that was
hostile to Aristide and what he represented symbolically, if not in
practice: the empowerment of the impoverished majority and the creation
of a democracy that defended their interests.” (p. 195)



“Though it came to power undemocratically,” Dupuy notes, “the new
government formed by Prime Minister Latortue had the full backing of the
United States, France, Canada, and the international financial
institutions that had denied support (political and economic) to the
democratically elected Aristide government.” (p. 175) In support of the
Western powers’ goal of “restoring the traditional pact of domination
between the Haitian economic elite and the state” (p. 194), “Latortue and
his government cracked down not only on Aristide’s armed supporters,
known as chimères (in French) or chimès (in Creole), but also on the
populations of the slums, especially of Port-au-Prince, that were
considered Aristide strongholds. Latortue also persecuted the key leaders
or activists of Lavalas in an effort to weaken the party or cause it to
splinter before the elections. That strategy succeeded”. (p. 21)



Though Dupuy offers few details of the Western-backed repression endured
by Haitians during Latortue’s rule, he still draws strong conclusions:



The number of people killed and injured, in addition to those who were
victims of rape and other physical abuse, was undoubtedly higher than
[estimates reporting about 1,500 people killed during Latortue’s regime].
…And, as many human rights reports made clear, the police and their
affiliates were responsible for the majority of the killings. As
mentioned, the Latortue government aligned itself with former army
soldiers and paramilitaries to help the police carry out its campaign of
repression against Aristide gangs and key Lavalas leaders. (pp. 189-90)



R

ead in a different way, however, much of The Prophet and Power supports
the well worn arguments claiming that Aristide had transformed from a
popular democrat into a repressive autocrat, essentially ensuring his own
downfall.



Dupuy recognizes that, by 1996-97, Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party
“was unquestionably the dominant political force in Haiti.” (p. 137)
Bared by Haiti’s constitution from serving consecutive presidential
terms, Aristide would run again for president in 2000. There is no space
here to sort out the controversy surrounding Haiti’s May 2000 legislative
and November 2000 presidential elections;[4] instead, the focus will be
on what Dupuy has to say about them. As is common, Dupuy suggests that –
despite not having been in office for 5 years – Aristide manipulated
Haiti’s provisional electoral council (CEP) in an effort to secure
absolute power. According to Dupuy: “Aristide was determined to govern
this time with his party in complete control of government, which
required him and his party to win at least two-thirds of the seats in
parliament. This would buffer Aristide and his prime minister from any
possible censure or a vote of no confidence in parliament.” (pp. 139-40)
As is also common, Dupuy offers no explanation of how he was able to do
all this despite not being elected until six months later. Adding
exponential hyperbole to this hollow analysis, Dupuy makes the patently
absurd claim that the disputed vote-counting methodology used in a
handful of the hundreds of electoral races “disenfranchis[ed] millions of
voters”. (p. 139)



According to Dupuy, once elected, “Aristide relied on armed gangs, the
police, and authoritarian practices to suppress his opponents …That
strategy did not work, though, as his government became increasingly
discredited and his popularity waned. …Consequently, unlike in 1991, the
majority of the population did not rally to save Aristide from being
forced out in 2004 or clamor for his return afterward. …Instead, the
majority pressed for new elections to restore legitimacy to government—in
which Aristide could not participate. The majority of Haitians, then, had
moved beyond Aristide.” (p. xv) This is the essence of Dupuy’s
characterization of Aristide’s second term: increasingly authoritarian,
decreasingly popular. The evidence he offers to support his view,
unfortunately, leaves a great deal to be desired.



On one page (160), Dupuy concedes that “Aristide may not have been
directly responsible for all the politically motivated criminal acts
committed by local officials, his grassroots supporters, or the police”,
but writes on another (p. 156): “To be sure, everyone knew the chimès
were working for Aristide and others”. Quite soberly, Dupuy adds “…but
such links had to be proved.” The problem, however, is that Dupuy makes
little effort at proof. For example, Dupuy writes that “the government
relied on its armed gangs to intimidate, and even kill, members of the
press and of the opposition” (p. 178) without mentioning anything
specific or citing any sources. Other times, when Dupuy does cite a
source to support such claims, the source cited offers no support:
“Aristide made the situation worse for himself by unleashing the chimès
who went on a rampage in the days preceding his departure, thereby
reinforcing his enemies’ claims that the country would be plunged into a
bloodbath unless Aristide was removed.” (p. 172) The 39-page Amnesty
International report Dupuy cites in support of the above statement
includes a grand total of one paragraph on human rights abuses against
Aristide opponents.[5] Though one would never suspect it from the tone of
Dupuy’s analysis, Amnesty International attributed a total of around
20-30 killings to the police and Fanmi Lavalas supporters between 2000
and 2003.[6]



At one point, Dupuy essentially concedes that there is no evidence that
Aristide created and wielded the chimès – but adds that no evidence is
evidence enough for him: “There is disagreement on Aristide’s role in
creating the chimès.[7] …In my view, however, it is immaterial whether or
not Aristide had a direct role in creating and directing the chimès. As
Clive Thomas noted, authoritarian regimes and rulers have often made use
of armed civilians to do the government’s dirty work without giving these
groups official sanction or status. …This is exactly how Aristide would
use the chimès. He denied being connected to them, but would never
condemn or declare them illegal, fight against them, or hold them
accountable for their actions.” (pp. 144-45) Because Aristide denied
control of the chimes, we are supposed to join Dupuy in believing that
his denial proves he is behind them. It is quite revealing that an
academic study by a leading scholar on Haiti is unable to offer any
evidence to support the oft-repeated claim that Aristide orchestrated the
chimès.



At other times, Dupuy contradicts his repeated claims that Aristide had
lost popular support: “there is no doubt that despite all that had
happened to erode that support, Aristide still resonated with a large
sector of the Haitian population, especially with the poor majority.”
March 2002 “polls confirmed that Aristide and his FL party would still
likely win an electoral contest against the [opposition] CD.” (pp.
164-65) Indeed, months after the coup, the US embassy in Haiti admitted
“if the election was held today, the Lavalas Party would win.”[8] When
you combine this with the massive (and virtually unreported)
demonstrations supporting Aristide in his final days,[9] statements like
the following are simply outrageous: “Except for armed gangs and some
supporters who remained loyal to him, the population as a whole offered
no resistance to the rebels from disbanded Haitian Army that forced him
from office and did not clamor for his reinstatement as they had in
1991.” (p. 2)



I

t would seem to me that any analysis of Aristide’s Haiti hoping to be
accurately described as “remarkably sage, wise, and balanced” would need
to make honest, good-faith attempts to understand and explain the role
Western powers played in Aristide’s fall, paying particular attention to
the international sanctions and their support for Aristide’s opposition.
His failure to even mention the “Ottawa Initiative on Haiti”, a January
2003 Canadian-hosted meeting where a group of high-level North American,
European, and Latin American diplomats discussed plans for President
Aristide’s removal and an ensuing military occupation is but one
shortcoming.[10] To a large extent, Dupuy tells both sides of the heated
debate surrounding Aristide’s legacy what they want to hear instead of
weighing the evidence and drawing the conclusions that follow.



Any “passionate, detached, and fair” study would also seem to have to
evaluate the extent gang activity in Haiti was politically rather than
simply criminally motivated, rather than simply making confident
assertions in the absence of evidence. One might also want to consider
whether a government opposed by ‘the West’ has any right to self-defense
against foreign supported war criminals threatening to return the country
to an era of violent repression. Unfortunately, Dupuy’s study leaves a
great deal to be desired. This has not prevented another reviewer from
fawning over the “attention to detail” in “his persuasive account” –
“exceptional in getting his facts straight” – while lamenting that Dupuy
may have been “too hard on the Democratic Convergence” (Aristide’s
opposition).[11]



The wait for a fair and detached evaluation of Haiti’s most recent period
of darkness continues…



Regan Boychuk completed his MA in political science at Toronto’s York
University in September 2005. If you are interested in his MA ‘thesis’
exploring Canada’s role in the February 2004 coup, he can be reached at
reganboychuk@hotmail.com.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The breached citadel, revised and
updated edn. (Toronto, ON: Canadian Scholars’, 2004), p. 261.



[2] On the US role in supporting Haitian death squads between 1991 and
1994, see the series of articles by Alan Nairn: “The eagle is landing”,
Nation (New York), vol. 259, no. 10 (3 October 1994), pp. 344-48; “Behind
Haiti’s paramilitaries”, Nation (New York), vol. 259, no. 13 (24 October
1994), pp. 458-61; “He’s our SOB”, Nation (New York), vol. 259, no. 14
(31 October 1994), pp. 481-82; “Our payroll, Haitian hit”, Nation (New
York), vol. 261, no. 11 (9 October 1995), pp. 369, 373-74; “Haiti under
the gun”, Nation (New York), vol. 262, no. 2 (8/15 January 1996), pp.
11-15; and “Haiti under cloak”, Nation (New York), vol. 262, no. 8 (26
February 1996), pp. 4-5.

On the first Bush administration’s undermining of the international
embargo against Haiti’s military junta, see Thomas Friedman, “Regional
group agrees to increase penalties on Haiti”, New York Times, 9 October
1991, p. A3.

On the Clinton administration’s undermining of the embargo and their
efforts to prevent their moves from becoming public, see the series of
articles by John Solomon: “Agency head failed to stop Texaco leak, citing
Bush treasury secretary”, Associated Press, 18 September 1994; “Treasury
secretary asks for probe in Haiti embargo case”, Associated Press, 20
September 1994; “Assets control director ignored advice to remove self
from Texaco case”, Associated Press, 29 September 1994; “OFAC director
was ‘protecting’ Brady in Texaco-Haiti case”, Associated Press, 1 October
1994; “Trade embargo office stripped of its enforcement divisions”,
Associated Press, 5 May 1995; “Treasury official found to have met with
probe subjects outside office”, Associated Press, 10 May 1996; and
“Charging administration ignored evidence, lawmaker seeks GAO probe”,
Associated Press, 13 June 1996.

On the US role in pressuring Aristide to accept economic conditions for
his return, see Alan Nairn, “Aristide banks on austerity”, Multinational
Monitor (Washington), vol. 16, nos. 7/8 (July/August 1994), pp. 7-9.

On the Clinton administration’s use of the junta’s terror to pressure
Aristide, see Mark Danner, “Haiti on the verge”, New York Review of
Books, vol. 40, no. 18 (4 November 1993), p. 26.



[3] Douglas Farah, “Democracy movement snuffed at birth”, Washington
Post, 9 May 1994, pp. A1ff; reprinted as “Grass roots democracy in Haiti:
All but dead”, International Herald Tribune (Paris), 10 May 1994, p. 3.



[4] The facts are convincingly sorted out in Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center,
“Elections 2000: Participatory democracy in Haiti”, February 2001.



[5] See Amnesty International, “Breaking the cycle of violence: A last
chance for Haiti?”, AMR 36/038/2004 (June 2004), p. 21.



[6] Peter Hallward, “Option zero in Haiti”, New Left Review (London),
second series, no. 27 (May-June 2004), pp. 40-41. For the period after
Aristide’s removal, see Athena R. Kolbe and Royce A. Hutson, “Human
rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: A
random survey of households”, Lancet (London), vol. 368, no. 9538 (2
September 2006), pp. 864-73 and “Clarification: Human rights abuse and
other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti”, Lancet (London),
vol. 369, no. 9559 (3 February 2007), pp. 355-56.



[7] Dupuy cites Maurice Lemoine, “Titide’s downfall: From prophet of the
slums to controlling ruler”, Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), September
2004, which confidently states: “There is no proof that Aristide had any
hand in running these groups.”



[8] Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean, “A people’s
fact finding investigation to Haiti: 18-24 April 2004”, sec. 2.



[9] Christina Leadlay, “Clearing Haiti's smoke and mirrors”, review of
Kevin Pina’s documentary “Haiti: Betrayal of Democracy”, Embassy
(Ottawa), vol. 1, no. 41 (16-22 February 2005), p. 7.



[10] One of the few attempts to appreciate the impact of the
international embargo against Aristide’s Haiti can be found in Paul
Farmer, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, and Patrice Nevil, “Unjust embargo of aid
for Haiti”, Lancet (London), vol. 361, no. 9355 (1 February 2003), pp.
420-23.



For some of the valuable accounts Dupuy did not utilize, see Ron Howell,
“Probing US ties to Haiti coup”, Newsday (New York), 17 March 2004, p.
A22 and Joshua Kurlantzick, “The coup connection: How an organization
financed by the US government has been promoting the overthrow of elected
leaders abroad”, Mother Jones (San Francisco), vol. 29, no. 6
(November/December 2004), pp. 15-17.



On US shipments of arms to Aristide’s opposition, see Nancy San Martin,
“Dominican army tightens watch”, Miami Herald, 30 November 2002, pp.
A1ff; Nancy San Martin, “Dominican and US troops’ joint exercise reduced
in scope”, Miami Herald, 20 February 2003, p. A8; Bryan Bender, “Aristide
backers blame US for ouster”, Boston Globe, 1 March 2004, pp. A1ff;
“Commission investigation finds US and Dominican Republic backed Haitian
‘rebels’”, Häiti Progrès (New York/Port-au-Prince), vol. 22, no. 3 (31
March 2004) and Control Arms Campaign, “The call for tough arms controls:
Voices from Haiti”, January 2006: “Between 2003 and 2005, a quarter of
weapons smuggled out of Miami, Pompano Beach, and Fort Lauderdale in
Florida were destined for Haiti, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms.” (p. 13)



On the Ottawa Initiative, see Michel Vastel, “Haïti mise en tutelle par
l’ONU?”, L’Actualité (Montreal), vol. 28, no. 4 (15 March 2003), pp.
14-15; Raymond Joseph, “Preparing for civil war”, New York Sun, 7 March
2003; and Yves Engler and Anthony Fenton, Canada in Haiti: Waging war on
the poor majority (Vancouver, BC: RED/Fernwood, 2005). Engler and
Fenton’s account is based, in part, on a series of Canadian government
documents released in response to their Access to Information Act
request.



[11] Bob Corbett, “Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community
and Haiti”, January 2007.


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