12063: Preliminary Comments on the "Negotiations" in Haiti (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: Robert Benodin <r.benodin@worldnet.att.net>

Comments of James R. Morrell

Preliminary Comments on the "Negotiations" in Haiti
May 16, 2002

In lieu of a closer study to be carried out by this project in the next
weeks

Quotation marks because there is a grossly asymmetrical relationship between
the two parties, leaving very little actually to be "negotiated." Rather it
is a question of whether the regime decides to hold new elections or not. If
it decides to, it can easily collect the opposition's one card, which is
agreement to participate, and the "negotiation" would be
successful. If it decides not to, there is nothing to negotiate because the
opposition consists of electoral politicians, not military men or
coup-makers.

    The situation is similar to the dynamics, which held after the
dissolution of parliament by President Préval in January 1999. Given that
parliament was dissolved and without it Haiti was in an unconstitutional
situation, he could either negotiate elections for a new parliament, or
simply rule by decree. He chose to negotiate, and the result was the March
6, 1999 agreement, which after repeated delays by the government, finally
produced
the May 21, 2000 elections. There was never any problem getting
representative members of the opposition to the table to sign the agreement.
The problem always was on the government side, and in the end not President
Préval but only state secretary Robert Manuel signed for the government.
Only days before it was signed, OPL senator Yvon Toussaint was shot and
killed. In his position as questor of the rump senate (the nine remaining
whose terms had not expired in January), he had been striving to keep the
senate open and preserve the thread of constitutional legitimacy. Most
likely he was shot for that, although we may never know, because as usual
the killers ran free. The OPL withdrew from the negotiations in protest, but
in fact, it participated in the elections the same as the other parties.

    Similarly, the "negotiations" today still revolve around whether the
regime has decided to hold new elections to correct its gross cheating in
June 2000, when it threw out more than a million ballots for
non-ruling-party senatorial candidates by using a method of counting that
only counted the top four finishers, disregarding votes for the other
fifteen or twenty candidates. This bumped up the percentages of the FL
candidates, who were
leading, so that virtually all won on the first round. According to the
election commissioner, however, only five won on the first round and the
rest needed to go to a second round. The only question before the
"negotiators," then, is whether the government has decided to correct this
by holding new elections. To date, there's no evidence it has, despite
fulsome assurances for foreign consumption.

    This is so because the June 2000 cheating was done in the full
realization that it would bring down the wrath of the United States and
international community. The United States alone had invested more than $50
million in Haitian elections during the 1990s. (See Henry F. Carey,
"Electoral Observation in Haiti.") The prize of gaining a monopoly of the
legislature, totally excluding the opposition, was coolly judged worth the
risk, because of the crucial role such a monopoly will play in the
perpetuation of personal/familial rule. The Duvaliers had similarly
calculated, and faced down the international community many times. So far
there is little sign that the pressure has increased enough to change the
parameters of this calculation, and unless it does, the "negotiations" will
remain a sham and the OAS mission to Haiti cannot possibly succeed.

    Superimposed on this already difficult context was the regime's decision
to unleash its gangs of armed enforcers on December 17, 2001 to burn down
the homes and offices of the leading opposition politicians. The Democratic
Convergence has accordingly added personal security to its list of demands
and preconditions, and it rescinded its earlier concession of recognizing
Aristide's presidency in return for early legislative elections. On April
16, 2002 the leaders of the two largest gangs of armed enforcers, bound to
Aristide by close ties of clientship and patronage, publicly threatened the
opposition, saying the December 17 violence was as nothing to what they
would get next time. Since there have been no arrests or prosecutions of the
December 17 arsonists, even the Convergence's minimal demand for personal
security has not been met, much less its substantive demands for a balanced
election commission, reasonable election timetable, etc.
James R. Morrell
Haiti Democracy Project
2303 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 588-8700
e-mail:  james.morrell@inxil.com
web page:  http://haitipolicy.org