PRECIS OF PETER SINGER'S ANTI-SPECIEST ARGUMENT

Bob Corbett, August 2000

Note that in this html form of the paper it is not a perfect 2 page model since the formatting changes that some. However, please note that at the end of the model paper below, I have copied a photo of the paper as exactly 2 pages, single spaced with 1 inch margins all round.

Peter Singer: "ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL".

Bob Corbett
Fall 2000

Part I:

THESIS: Animals have a moral right to consideration of their rights especially in regard to suffering pain.

REASONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR WHY SINGER BELIEVES THE THESIS:

1. The standard arguments which justify the morality of the traditional ways in which which we humans treat animals (including eating them), is rooted in the view that there is a morally relevant distinction between animals and humans.
2. However, this alleged difference does not really exist. No matter which variable we might consider, there will be some animals which have the trait more than some humans. Thus the justification is rooted in a non-rational bias.
3. The only relevant variable -- the ability to suffer pain -- is experienced by humans and animals alike. Thus a dramatic and radical moral reassessment of our relationship with animals is called for.
4. Contemporary moral thinking starts with an ideal notion of equality. This cannot seriously be rooted in the FACT of equality since this fact either does not exist, or is unknown whether it does or does not, and thus is not a suitable ground for such a moral principle.

   Rather, this fundamental moral principle is an ideal toward which humans believe they should tend.

5. In the past we have seen examples of how our moral understanding of equality has been extended to groups to whom it was not previously accorded. The key examples in history concern our views of slaves, people or color and women.
6. There is now a need, on the basis of a careful rational examination of animals, to see that we need to extend the notion of equality not only to these other groups, but also to animals.
7. The key to the morally unacceptable behavior toward animals is making them, or tolerating them to suffer without due consideration of their interest in not suffering.

PART II: Comments and considerations:

I am not persuaded by the argument of Peter Singer, but I'm also not sure that I can make a very strong argument to show why. Rather, I will dwell on a few of the considerations which give me reasons for at least strong pause if not downright disagreement.

It seems that one reading Singer's argument should pay attention to the fact that his most fundamental principle, the principle of equality, is NOT one for which he gives an argument, and he even seems to suggest there is no such argument. Rather, this is a moral ideal which one takes up. What is not clear from this argument is why one would take it up and whether or not it would in any way be a moral failing if one did not take it up.

There are certain senses in which I am extremely uncomfortable with the principle of equality. There is a distinction to be made between acts which I personally commit and acts which I do not commit. These are often called acts of commission and acts of omission.

When I am interacting with another person, and I do something which directly affects that person (an act of commission), then I think I need decent moral reasons for the effects of my acts. In this context I am sympathetic that I should pay attention to the principle of equality. (In this sense, I do feel compelled to consider his case for equality with animals quite seriously since when I eat them, for example, I am acting in a way that directly requires the death of the animal that I may do so. If the case for equality is successful, then it would have some strong moral power.)

On the other hand, there are things that happen in the world without me being involved. Some of those things cause pain and suffering and hardship. If is often held by those who hold notions of equality that I have some moral responsibility to act to alleviate this suffering and that to not do so is to commit some moral failing. I do not find such claims persuasive and thus have doubts about the general fundamental principle of equality itself.

But has Singer even made the case adequately that our "speciesist" view (that our species is somehow morally special) is wrong? Again, I'm not convinced by the argument, yet cannot specify exact objections to it. Perhaps I am just terrified by the moral implications of his being right. At least the argument is strong enough to compel me to follow it more deeply and see what both critics and supporters do to tear down or shore up the argument.

Photo copy of the paper as printed out

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