[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
6618: Re 6560: Driver again to Morse (fwd)
From: "Tom F. Driver" <email@example.com>
To Richard Morse, in response to these words in his Jan. 6 post:
> We still haven't addressed my original point which is: two branches of the > American government fighting each other, CIA sabotaging the Executive
> over foreign policy in Haiti. It seems treasonous to me. A sign of things to > come.
There are two possible explanations of the apparent split within the US
Government over Haiti policy at the time of the Harlan County incident. One
is that the split was real, as you assume, and that the Executive branch was
unable to control the CIA (and perhaps other governmental elements as well).
However, it is also possible that the split was not real but instead was a
strategy -- something along the lines of a good-cop/bad-cop scenario. That
is, while pretending to support democracy and defend human rights in Haiti,
the U.S. may have actually been working to oppose them. If this sounds
cynical, it is no more so than has been the case for a long time with U.S.
policy toward the rest of Latin America. If the U.S. has not had a policy of
supporting anti-democratic strongmen throughout the region, it has certainly
had the habit of doing so.
To my mind, a strong reason for thinking that the White House, as well as
the CIA, did not want Aristide returned in 1993 was its behavior at the time of
the Governors Island agreement in July of that year. Aristide did not want to
sign that agreement, which called for his return at the end of October,
because he did not trust Cedras and the other military men to live up to their
part of the bargain. Nor did he trust the U.S. to force them to do so. He
signed only after immense pressure from the U.S. He and Cedras refused to
speak face to face at that conference. For his part, Cedras, having given his
signature, returned post haste to Haiti and began within days to escalate the
violence in the streets of Port-au-Prince. To which the U.S. response was --
nothing. It had strong-armed both men to sign, but when Cedras promptly
began to undermine the agreement with the use of ever-greater violence, the
U.S. sat on its hands. It did not agree to act against the Generals until more
than a year later, by which time it had obtained from Aristide an agreement
to its own economic plans for Haiti. It is not at all clear that during this
period the CIA was acting contrary to the true intent of the National Security
Council in the White House.
P.S. Patrick Slavin's recent comment to the Corbett list is germane:
namely that the memorial Mass on September 11, 1993, where Antoine
Izmery was slain, was organized "to show the absurdity of the Governors
Island 'reconciliation' process."
Tom F. Driver
New York City