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#548: Structural adjustment :Dailey comments
From: PETER DAILEY <HOLMES11@prodigy.net>
Re Dr. Gill's message, in case anyone has failed to notice,
the "Structural Reforms," about which so much heat and
so little light was generated in these pages and elsewhere
not so long ago, are largely an accomplished fact.
The major "reform," with the most far-reaching and
potentially catastrophic consequences was the reduction
of tariffs on agricultural imports. This became law in
1995. All the subsequent controversy, and the bringing
down of the government in 1997, accomplished was to
prevent the implementation of those measures tossed in
by the lenders to cushion the blow and help the least
competitive agricultural sector in the hemisphere, the
Haitian peasants, cope with the onslaught.
In terms of consequences for the Nation, the
privatization of state industries was never more than a
footnote. Many of them were closed already, and have
since been sold off. But since the sale of Teleco
threatened the GOH's principal patronage machine and
source of extra-budgetary funds, and the sinecures of
many socially and politically well connected people who
were otherwise unemployable, the interests and welfare
of the nation were held hostage to this issue. And now we
see that in spite of the efforts of "young activists" like
Rene Civil and the JPP the privatization of Teleco is
pushing to a conclusion.
Since "structural adjustment" has been a failure
nearly everywhere else it has been applied, what, if
anything, might have been done. What has Aristide's
"leadership" on this issue consisted of? For a period of
about a year he speculated before international audiences
about a "third way" without ever deigning to delve into
specifics. On a retail level it was the usual demagoguery -
structural adjustment would take the jobs of the street
sweepers, latrine cleaners, etc. And then a long silence.
Boredom? Or should we conclude that he is reconciled to
these measures and will let Preval take political
responsibility so that he can attack them when back in
office? Who knows? Who cares?
Did the GOH ever really have a choice? We have all read
scores of proposals for development over the past four
years, all of which made more sense than the one the
international lenders apparently contemplate. I have yet
to read one of these proposals that had anything
concrete to say about how such development might be
funded.
Although the governing classes could probably have
gotten along without additional foreign capital, for the
people of Haiti it has only further accelerated the
downward spiral, whence this weird nostalgia for the good
old days of Jean-Claude.
Although I would be interested in hearing otherwise, I
doubt the GOH ever had a choice other than to dig in,
negotiate the best deal possible, and move on.
Apart from those amounts tacitly set aside by the lenders
for the satisfaction of the corrupt instincts of Haiti's
rulers, I doubt that the banks will intentionally leave very
much of the disbursement of the money to the
government's discretion, but will instead misspend it
themselves.
Peter Dailey