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#4635: Analysis of recent events in Haiti (fwd)
From: Reginald Verdieu <marxengels@hotmail.com>
Mr. Corbett My name is Reginald Verdieu, I am the Haiti program intern at
the Center for International Policy, can you please forward this to the
list, this article can also accessed at our website www.ciponline.org.
The political actors in Haiti, by refusing to play by the rules, risk
damaging the democratic process.
By Reginald Verdieu
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order for a society to function properly, in a democracy, all of its
political actors, internal and external, have to bw willing to accept the
limitations of such a political system. They must all be willing to make
compromises. The ruling parties have to allow opposition groups to compete
freely and fairly for the right to rule, especially in the electoral
process. The losers of any election need to accept the results as gracefully
as possible. External actors need to respect the decisions of the internal
actors. The current political situation in Haiti is the result of what
happens when the political actors are not ready nor willing to obey these
rules.
Historical Overview
Since his return to the presidency of Haiti in 1994, after three years in
exile in the United States as result of a military coup d?etat, Jean
Bertrand Arisitide and the Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party have manipulated the
political process in order to ensure the continuing dominance of his party.
Aristide was succeeded in 1995 by one of his close allies, Rene Preval, who
continued Aristide?s policy of manipulation.
Preval enjoyed neither the popularity of his predecessor nor the political
savvy needed to be an effective leader in Haiti. Thus resulting in his
inability to consolidate power in the Parliament. Finding it impossible to
work with the legislative body he dissolved it in January of 1999 and has
been governing by presidential decree ever since.
The dissolution of Parliament resulted in one of the worse economic
situations that Haiti has ever experienced, many have said that the
situation is worse than the one they faced during the U.N./OAS embargo of
the early 1990?s. For by shutting down parliament Preval had effectively cut
off $500 million of international aid to Haiti. According to Haitian laws
international funds can only be budgeted by the Parliament.
Preval, after incessant pressure from national and international
organizations to hold parliamentary elections, appointed a bi-partisan
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) in order to plan for local and national
elections. The CEP contained two representatives from the opposition party,
Espace de Concertation (ESPACE), and a non-partisan President, Leon Manus,
but the CEP faced constant pressure to abide to the wishes of their boss.
Preval made it clear from the beginning that he was intent on influencing
the decisions of the CEP. One of his boldest moves was the expulsion of the
International Foundation for Election Systems? advisor to the CEP, Micheline
Begin, from the country.
Preval and the CEP could not agree on a date for the elections, on several
occasions Preval postponed the elections claiming that more time was needed
to efficiently plan them. It was to the advantage of the Lavalas party to
postpone the elections for two reasons. The delay allowed the Lavalas party
to continue a very effective voter registration campaign, many of the
Lavalas supporters are from the lower class and do not completely understand
the electoral process and did not register until late in the process. It
also allowed the elections to be held closer to the presidential debates in
which former president Aristide will be a candidate. Aristide is still the
most popular politician in Haiti and is the overwhelming favorite to win the
Presidential elections that are scheduled for later this year. The Lavalas
party hoped to delay the local and parliamentary elections in order to ride
Aristide?s coat-tails to victories.
The Elections
The Elections were finally held on May 21, 2000. The Lavalas Family won the
elections by a land slide, opposition parties made immediate claims of
fraud, their claims were overshadowed by international observers who began
to report that the May 21, 2000 elections were the best that they had ever
observed in Haiti. The claims of fraud began to gain credibility, however,
after the national police arrested or harassed some of the more vocal
members of the opposition. This seemed to be a concerted effort by the
government to either shut them up or thwart their efforts in the run-offs
that were planned three weeks later. Most of the charges that were brought
up against these people were later dropped. Human rights groups quickly
condemned these methods of intimidation. The situation was further
complicated by the Organization of American States (OAS)?s announcement on
May 31, 2000 that the elections were flawed. They stated that the CEP only
tabulated the votes of the top four vote getters, violating Haiti?s
constitutional law which states that a candidate can only be declared the
winner of the first round by winning fifty percent of all of the votes plus
one. The OAS suggested that the CEP recount all of the votes in order to
comply with the electoral law.
The OAS suggestion was supported by most other international observer
groups, the United States, and most of the opposition groups in Haiti,
casting serious doubts on the legitimacy of the elections. The CEP defended
its results by stating that as the only body legally charged with
administering elections in Haiti its decisions concerning the elections
cannot be challenged by any other bodies, especially an international
organization such as the OAS. The Preval administration also supported the
results since they gave the Lavalas party an overwhelming majority in the
Senate and at least one fourth of the seats in the house of deputies.
The Aftermath
This created a very interesting power struggle, which included at least six
actors, with the OAS, the international community, and Haiti?s opposition
parties on one side and the CEP, Preval and the Lavalas party on the other.
Those that supported the OAS demanded that the CEP change their tabulation
methodology and those that supported the CEP wanted the result to remain as
is.
As an observer the OAS does not have any decision-making powers and can
merely give suggestions. Their power comes from their reputation as credible
independent observer and the ability to grant legitimacy to any process that
they take part in. Thus it was important for the OAS to stand firm by their
decision that the May 21, 2000 elections were flawed and should be
re-counted. They essentially gave Haiti an ultimatum to either change their
methodology be in agreement with the 1999 provisional law or they will no
longer participate in the electoral process in Haiti which would greatly
damage the credibility of the CEP in the eyes of the international
community.
The United States has given the OAS a much needed endorsement. They not only
released a statement in support of the OAS, but the U.S. state department
has hinted that President Bill Clinton?s administration might not recognize
a legislative body that was elected as a result of the May 21, 2000
elections. The U.S. Senate has urged the Clinton administration to take
tougher measures against the Preval administration. France, Canada, and the
United Nations have also granted their support to the OAS.
A large majority of the opposition parties supported the OAS their
announcement on May 31, 2000. They have published many statements denouncing
the elections and further highlighted the irregularities of the elections,
they pleaded to the international community to pressure the Haitian
government for a recount. The two representatives of ESPACE resigned from
the, thus increasing the polarization of parties.
The CEP, as the authoritative voice concerning electoral laws, thought that
it would blemish its prestige at home if it followed the suggestions of the
OAS. They asserted that the OAS was trying to undermine the democratic
process in Haiti. Claiming that their methodology remained true to the
electoral law. For although the law demands that a candidate must win 50%
plus one, it does not explain how to reach this 50% in an election when more
than one Senate position is open in each departmental race. Furthermore,
their methodology was consistent with previous senatorial elections in which
they had to fill numerous seats in one election.
Under normal conditions (which is a rarity in Haiti) Haitians would elect,
every two years, one-third of the senate to six year terms. However, since
the senate had been inactive for almost two years sans any new elections,
the CEP had to fill the seats of two thirds of the senate.
They claim that if they had counted all of the votes then divide them into
two and then treat each half as though they were one, as the OAS suggested,
it would have made it mathematically impossible for any candidate to gain
fifty percent plus one as demanded by the law. Thus, they chose a method
that would preserve the intent of the law even though it might be violating
it in the literal sense. The CEP also tried to gain the support of Haitians
by appealing to their nationalistic side. They stated on numerous occasions
that Haitians and not the international community should solve Haiti?s
problem.
Preval and FL members, in an effort to capitalize on the election results,
supported the CEP and further fueled the nationalistic arguments.
Protesters, who professed to be supporters of FL, twice during a four day
period, staged violent protests that caused all businesses in the capital to
shut down. They demanded that the CEP version of the election results be
made official or they will continue to protest until their demand is met.
During the same period of the President of the CEP, Leon Manus, who
initially scolded the OAS for demanding a re-tabulation but later changed
his mind to conform to the OAS? suggestions, fled to the United States. In a
public statement Mr. Manus stated "At the top governmental level unequivocal
messages were transmitted to me on the consequences that would follow if I
refused to publish the false final results."
The CEP and Preval defied the OAS and the rest of the international
community by making the May 21 election results official and holding a
second round of elections on July 9,2000. The elections were boycotted by
opposition groups, the OAS and the rest of the international observers. The
second round of elections was further tarnished by a low voter turn out. The
result of the Haitian government?s defiant stance remains to be seen. One
thing we do know for sure is that the recent debates over the May 21, 2000
elections has been a devastating blow to the future of democracy in Haiti.
Conclusion
Democracy cannot exist without the support of the populace. Since the
departure of Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986 the people of Haiti has made it
clear that they want a democratic government and have done their part to
achieve that goal. Democracy hasn?t been beneficial for most Haitians
however, as political bickering has resulted in a decrease in the quality of
life of most Haitians. Their discontent was apparent in the run offs in
which in some regions less than 10% of the registered voters participated,
as opposed to the 60% that participated in the first round. I am worried
that if things don?t improve in Haiti the people will no longer support
democracy in Haiti.
All concerning parties need to remember that democracy is a difficult
process, especially during the early stages, and that there is not an ideal
model for democracy but many different forms, none of which are perfect. The
current idealistic model of democracy that most political actors want to
apply in Haiti is threatening the democratic process. I have heard people in
Haiti, too often, say "why can?t our country be more like the other
democratic countries in the region." This way of thinking is dangerous for
these people are not looking at the situation in Haiti in a historical
context. In most of the countries that Haiti is being compared to, if they
look back far enough, they will find situations analogous to the current
situation in Haiti. They should Instead be channeling their energy into
trying to figure out an effective Haitian model of democracy and stop trying
to duplicate models that have worked in other countries.
Similarly, The opposition parties, instead of constantly complaining to the
international community about the abuses of the Lavalas regime and looking
for them to solve their problems, need to focus on how they can better
strengthen themselves in order to become a viable threat to the ruling
party. The international community needs to allow the opposition parties the
chance to learn the political game on their own. This is not to say that
they cannot play a role in the strengthening of civil society in Haiti, but
they need to avoid being used by the opposition parties to disrupt the
political process.
All parties need to figure out how to make the process work, the longer that
the quarreling continues the more the people will grow nostalgic of the
Duvalier era when even though they might not have had as many freedoms as
they do now but the country was more stable, and the economic situation was
better for most. The international community and the opposition parties need
to be careful not to create a situation in Haiti that would make it possible
for the people to reject democracy and embrace Aristide or some other
populist leader as a benevolent dictator.
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