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25602: Dailey: Re 25593 (Comment) (fwd)




From: Peter Dailey <phdailey@msn.com>

Given the current state of opinion in Washington, you could probably find more support for a bill to name Chetchenya the 51st State than you would for a measure committing the U.S. to do anything at all regarding Haiti. Last week Kofi Annan stressing the need for "boots on the ground" went to Washington DC to make a personal appeal to Secretary Rice for U.S. troops to join MINUSTAH arguing that even a small number would provide a significant psychological boost. They turned him down flat.

Although under Clinton U.S. policy towards Haiti was in a state of flux, and was constantly being shaped and reshaped, the approach of the Bush administration for the last four years has been remarkably consistent. The basic tenet has been that there is nothing happening in Haiti or likely to happen in Haiti of sufficient importance to the U.S. to justify becoming entangled in what they regard as an undifferentiated Haitian mess and that any efforts to do otherwise are likely to be expensive and unsuccessful. This policy of not-so-benign neglect was first articulated in a speech by Condoleeza Rice to the Council on Foreign Relations several weeks prior to the November, 2000 election when she stated "we have spent several billion dollars now in Haiti and we're going home." Although in December, 2000 during the last days of the Clinton administration Anthony Lake made his 25th and last official trip to Port-au-Prince to meet with Aristide and obtained his agreement to "8 Points"- steps he would take to end the crisis- this was the last significant bilateral contact between the U.S. and Haiti for two and a half years. All subsequent unsuccessful attempts to negotiate an agreement between Lavalas and the opposition were carried out by Ambassador Einaudi and the OAS under the rubric of several U.N. resolutions.

A small but significant shift in the U.S. approach occurred near the end of the summer of 2003 when Ambassador Terence Todman was brought out of retirement and sent to Haiti as Bush's personal representative. I imagine that if Bush and his closest advisors- his political people- were aware enough of Aristide to have formed an opinion it would have been similar to Jesse Helms's. However, they faced a challenge of overriding importance and that was making sure that Florida stayed in the red column in 2004. Todman apparently concluded that at least in the short term Aristide represented the best chance for stability and for avoiding a crisis that would set off a wave of boat people and add a wild card to the volatile Florida political mix. This was the Bush administration's principal concern, to which the wishes of those who would have liked to kidnap Aristide and put him on trial for narcotics trafficking, etc. would have to be subordinated.

I have no idea if an informal understanding was ever reached or what signals might have been sent, but to posit a de facto understanding at least explains several things that happened subsequently and that those who believe that Aristide's February ouster was the result of a deliberate and premeditated U.S. plan of longstanding really can't account for.

Here are some of them:

With no advance warning and very little explanation, the U.S. announces that it will no longer block the disbursement of the international loans.

At his valedictory speech, outgoing Ambassador Curran blasts what he calls the "chimeres of Washington," by which he is understood to mean Stanley Lucas and the IRI, for seeking to undermine and subvert Bush administration policy toward Haiti.

There are notable instances of cooperation between Aristide and the DEA, like the arrest and extradition of Ketant, and between Aristide and the U.S. coastguard over intercepting boat people. (On February 28 & 29, the Haitian coastguard station involved in these efforts is attacked by chimeres.) Aristide, who heretofore has blasted the unnamed parties responsible for blocking the loans as "economic terrorists" finds a new target for an unprecedented campaign of demagoguery- the 1826 (?) indemnification agreement with France. While Lavalas legal hacks put aside their research on Navassa and rack up the billable hours on looking for an enforceable basis for Haiti's claim- it turns out not surprisingly that there isn't one- Haiti is launched on an anti-French campaign rivalling in virulence the one being carried out in Washington, and the Haitian people are bombarded by radio commercials the basic message of which is: "Your check is in the mail."

On February 13, Haiti reaches the tipping point. A small force, more or less identical in leadership and size to one that briefly occupied the National Palace on December 17, 2001 and was put to rout in a matter of hours takes over police stations in Hinche and Mirebelais. During the 1980s the U.S. armed, financed, trained etc. anti-government forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and elsewhere and there is nothing inherently outlandish about the idea that they would do so again here. However, in these instances the Contras, Jonas Savimbi etc. were hailed as freedom fighters, invited to Washington, given medals, and their opponents correspondingly denigrated. If that was what was taking place in Haiti, why would Colin Powell do everything he could to discredit them repeatedly calling them thugs and murderers and pledging that the U.S. would not allow them to shoot their way into power?

Here is what Rumsfeld had to say on February 13, 2004: It is always sad to see countries struggling, trying to find their way, trying to sort through difficulties. [sigh!] It is something that I am hopeful that the countries of the region and the international organizations in the region or hemisphere and the world will interest themselves in and that they will be able to navigate through what is obviously difficult times for them. It seems to ebb and flow and at the moment it is not deteriorating that I have seen in recent days."

I have looked at this statement many times since, and it seems even more sinister than it did originally. The Haitians are killing each other again- it is so sad! No suggestion of even the remotest curiosity about the context, speculation about the reasons, or value judgments. He has discerned something fundamental about Haitian history that I for one had never realized, that political violence ebbs and flows like the tides, and presumably like the tides obeys only the moon. Rumsfeld is not aware of any deterioration. [In fact, the situation had deteriorated quite dramatically over the last four days ias Haitians struggled to find their way in Gonaives, St. Marc, the Central Plateau and elsewhere.] These are certainly difficult times for Haiti with the Haitians killing each other. Wouldn't it be nice if someone else- a country or organization- would take an interest.

On February 16, in response to another question, Rumsfeld commented "Needless to say, everyone is hopeful that the situation, which tends to ebb and flow down there, will stay below a certain threshold, and that there's -- we have no plans to do anything."

So the relevant question in July, 2005 is: "Given the way the violence ebbs and flows down there, what is the threshold beyond which the U.S. will feel an obligation to act? How many Haitian deaths is too many?"

Peter Dailey